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ABSTRACT
STUDIES OF THE AIRBNB PEER-TO-PEER PLATFORM
Qi Pan
Aviv Nevo
This dissertation is an empirical study of a peer-to-peer market, Airbnb. Chapter 2 examines
the impact of Airbnb on the rental housing market. Airbnb can potentially cannibalize
long-term rental and affects rental housing supply and affordability. However, Airbnb also
provides extra income for long-term renters. Existing regulations try to improve rental
supply, either by prohibiting certain types of apartments from operating on Airbnb or by
controlling the maximum nights a listing can be rented. It remains unclear whether these
regulations can achieve their goals. Using Airbnb listings data and a novel dataset that
allows me to trace the moving history of long-term renters, I build a structural model and
simulate the effectiveness of these policies. I find that Airbnb does cannibalize the long-term
rental supply market. Airbnb also has a greater negative impact on long-term renters with
higher income. The counterfactual results suggest that the first policy is better in improving
the welfare of long-term renters than the second policy. Chapter 3 turns from the impact of
Airbnb on the long-term rental market to the pricing on the platform. On many e-commerce
platforms such as Airbnb, the pricing problems are intrinsically dynamic. However, many
sellers on these platforms do not update prices frequently. In this chapter, I develop a
dynamic pricing model to study the revenue and welfare implication of automated pricing,
which allows sellers to update their prices without manual interference. The model focuses
on three factors through which automated pricing influences sellers: price adjustment cost,
buyer’s varying willingness to pay and inventory structure. In the model, I also take into
account competition among sellers. Utilizing a unique data set of detailed Airbnb rental
history and price trajectory in New York City, I find that the price rigidity observed in
the data can be rationalized by a price adjustment cost ranging from 0.9% to 2.2% of the
iv
listed price. Moreover, automated pricing can increase the platform’s revenue by 4.8% and
the hosts’ (sellers’) by 3.9%. The renters (buyers) could be either better off or worse off,
depending on the length of their stays.
v
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CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is an empirical study of the peer-to-peer platform, Airbnb. Chapter 2
examines the impact of Airbnb on the rental housing market. Chapter 3 turns from the
impact of Airbnb to the pricing problem on the platform. Specifically, Chapter 3 studies
the effect of the automated pricing feature using a dynamic pricing model. In this chapter,
I provide a brief introduction of Airbnb and discuss my research questions.
1.1. Airbnb
Airbnb is an online marketplace company that connects people looking for renting out their
homes with people who are seeking short-term accommodations. It currently covers more
than 81,000 cities and 191 countries worldwide. The company does not own any of the real
estate listings; it acts as a broker, receiving a commissions fee from each booking. Airbnb
takes 3% commission of every booking from listing owners, and between 6% and 12% from
guests. A listing owner can share a spare room in her/his apartment with guests or the
listing owner can rent out the entire apartment. The listing owner has the freedom to
determine the nightly rate of the apartment, the cleaning fee, the minimum length of stay,
the cancellation policy and the availability of the apartment for each day. Airbnb provides a
platform for listing owners to display and advertise their listings and to guests to search for
their desired listings with various searching criteria. The rise of Airbnb generated a broad
set of fascinating research questions. In this dissertation, I mainly focus on two of those
questions. The first one is about the impact of Airbnb on the traditional long-term rental
market. The second one is related to how listing owners price their listing on the platform.
1.2. The Impact of Airbnb
The introduction of Airbnb can increase the supply of travel accommodations, which could
benefit travelers by making travel more affordable. However, this benefit might not be the
first order consideration for most of the households, especially for those who are renter-
1
s. Because Airbnb does not own any of the listings on the platform, Airbnb’s expansion
could lead to a reduced supply of housing as properties shift from serving local residents
to serving Airbnb travelers, which hurts local residents by raising housing costs. Therefore,
evaluating the impact of Airbnb on the long-term rental market is more relevant to house-
holds. As Airbnb expands its market, some local authorities impose different restrictions
on the platform in order to reduce Airbnb’s negative impact. For instance, San Francisco
allows no more than 90 rental days per year per listing and New York City does not allow
any rental less than 30 consecutive days if the permanent resident does not reside in the
apartment. Hence, one aim of this study is to use a structural model to quantify the impact
of Airbnb on the long-term rental market as well as the impact of regulations that try to
impose restrictions on Airbnb.
1.3. The Pricing Problem on Airbnb
The pricing problem on Airbnb is another interesting topic. On Airbnb, listing owners can
fully control how much to charge for each night. Since listing owners are facing a fixed
inventory and limited selling time problem, their pricing strategy should be dynamic. In
the data, however, a large number of listing owners do not adjust their prices. This puzzling
observation motivated me to investigate the cause of the price rigidity. In the meantime,
Airbnb provides a new feature called “smart pricing” that can automatically price a listing.
Therefore, I build a structural dynamic pricing model to quantify the force that prevents
listing owners from adjusting their prices, and to evaluate the revenue and welfare impact
of “smart pricing”. The results in this study are useful to both listing owners and Airbnb.
In particular, listing owners and Airbnb could know much they lose due to price rigidity
and how much they could gain as a result of “smart pricing”.
2
CHAPTER 2 : AIRBNB AND THE HOUSING RENTAL MARKET
2.1. Introduction
In the past 12 years, Airbnb has become a company that operates in more than 191 countries
and has 7 million listings. As a peer-to-peer marketplace, Airbnb provides an alternative
channel for landlords to market their properties to short-term tourists, in addition to the
traditional long-term rental market for local residents. Airbnb also enables long-term renters
to share their apartments with tourists or travelers. On the one hand, since the return to
listing a rental unit on Airbnb could be higher than listing on the traditional long-term
rental market, landlords would have incentives to switch from the long-term market to
the short-term market. This switching may result in rent increase due to the reduction of
supply in the long-term market. On the other hand, Airbnb could be an important source of
income that helps long-term renters afford their apartments. In this chapter, I empirically
evaluate how these two forces balance out.
The rapid growth of Airbnb, especially in large cities such as New York City, has prompted
questions over whether it exacerbates the rental housing shortage and whether the platform
should be more strictly regulated. In 2016, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo signed a
law that states that renting out an entire apartment for short-term stays of less than 30 days
is illegal. Other regulations, such as restricting the total number of days that a host can
rent out her/his apartment, are widely discussed around the country. Meanwhile, Airbnb
argues1 that the majority of the hosting income is used to pay for housing cost and Airbnb
helps long-term renters stay in their homes. Most of the discussions on the regulations are
not based on an empirical study; therefore, an analysis with a more theoretical basis is
important to both policymakers and researchers.
The questions that interest both policymakers and researches are: What is the impact of
Airbnb on the long-term rental market? How effective are the regulations on Airbnb? To
1https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public comments/2015/05/01740-96152.pdf
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Figure 1: Rental Market Structure
answer these questions, I need to know how long-term renters make their location choices
with and without the ability to list their apartments on Airbnb or to be able to list under
certain constraints. Figure 1 demonstrates the rental market structure. The rental market
structure shows that Airbnb can influence the long-term rental supply by shifting the long-
term supply towards short-term supply. Airbnb can also provide extra income to long-term
renters who are willing to share their apartments with travelers. I assume that when making
decisions, long-term renters will choose the location that yields the highest utility taking
into account location characteristics, rental price and the potential income from Airbnb.
Through the potential income, Airbnb can reduce a long-term renter’s cost of renting an
apartment. However, if landlords expect that they can earn a higher return from Airbnb
instead of in the traditional long-term rental market, they may de-list their apartments from
the long-term rental market and list them on Airbnb. The cannibalization of Airbnb in the
long-term rental market could lead to a rent increase, thus hurts the long-term renters. The
actual impact of Airbnb on long-term renters depends on which force (supply shifting or
extra income) dominates.
To understand the impact of Airbnb on long-term renters, I build and estimate a dynamic
model that incorporates 1) heterogenous long-term renter’s location choice and 2) landlord
4
and long-term renter’s decisions to list on Airbnb using detailed Airbnb listings data and
long-term renters’ moving history data. The dynamic behavior of long-term renters should
be taken into account for two possible reasons. First, the persistence in location decisions
suggests the presence of moving costs. However, unobserved heterogeneity in tastes for
locations could be an alternative explanation for this persistency. I show in Section 2.3
that moving cost is a more likely explanation. Second, when long-term renters choose a
location, they form expectations about the evolution of prices in each location. If renters
only consider current period prices but not future prices, the current period prices should
not affect the moving probability of tomorrow directly. This can be tested in the data. A
consequence of such a dynamic model is that shocks to the price have very different effects
if households perceive them as temporary as opposed to permanent, a feature that static
models fail to capture.
The dynamic consideration is a key component in this model. Failure to account for this
dynamic behavior by estimating a static model would lead to biased estimates. To demon-
strate the intuition, it is useful to think about the following two cases. The first comparison
is a dynamic model versus a static model with moving costs. The second comparison is
a dynamic model versus a static model without moving costs. In the first case, the bias
caused by a static model depends on the situations regarding how the current characteristics
predict future value. If higher values of a given characteristic predict improvement in the
future, the estimate will be biased toward positive infinity. This is because a static model
attributes the future improvement to the current change. If higher values of a given char-
acteristic predict deterioration in the future, the estimate will be biased toward negative
infinity. For instance, rental prices are persistent, and a higher price today implies worse
expected value tomorrow. Therefore, a static model with moving costs would overestimate
the price responsiveness since the price coefficient is negative. In the second case, since a
static model does not consider the moving cost, the static model will attribute the tendency
of immobility to the low responsiveness, thus can potentially bias the estimates toward zero.
Therefore, if a higher value of a characteristic predicts future improvement, a static model
5
will underestimate the coefficient. If a higher value predicts a worse future, such as rental
price, the direction of the bias of a static model is ambiguous. This is because of the effect
discussed in the first case.
In order to recover the preference, I build a dynamic model. In the model, a forward-looking
long-term renter first makes a choice among various locations and the number of bedrooms
in the city, taking into account location characteristics, rental prices, the share of Airbnb
listings and the opportunity to list their apartments on Airbnb. Second, landlords decide
either to rent their apartments to long-term renters or to list on Airbnb, and long-term
renters decide whether to share their apartments with Airbnb users. Third, the rental price
and Airbnb price are determined at the point where the long-term and short-term markets
clear. I recover the preference of long-term renters that allows me to simulate market
outcomes in the absence of Airbnb to explore its impact and evaluate market outcomes
under different policies.
To estimate the model, I follow the setting proposed in the dynamic sorting model liter-
ature (Bayer et al., 2016) and the method suggested by Hotz & Miller (1993). Using the
conditional choice probabilities (CCP) calculated directly from the data, I can establish a
mapping between model parameters and the CCP, and recover the flow utility and moving
cost via maximum likelihood. Next, I can further decompose the flow utility as a function of
several characteristics and recover the parameters using an instrumental variable approach.
On the supply side, the cost parameters can be estimated using the market share of Airbnb
listings.
The results of the model suggest that high-income renters are less price-sensitive than low-
income renters, while non-white renters are more responsive to price than white renters. As
for the moving cost, it rages from $1,392 to $2,903 depending on a renter’s social-economic
status, the number of bedrooms and the length of the occupancy. High-income renters tend
to have a lower moving cost, which leads to higher moving probability. The results also
suggest that operating an Airbnb listing could cost as high as $4,200 per month. The high
6
operating cost explains why the share of Airbnb listings is low – 2% of the 2 million supply.
Given the model estimates, I first evaluate the impact of the introduction of Airbnb. I find
that Airbnb does cannibalize the long-term rental supply. Airbnb has a greater negative
impact on high-income renters than low-income renters. Within the same income group,
non-white renters suffer less than white renters after the introduction of Airbnb. These
results are compatible with the fact that high-income and white renters are more likely to
have Airbnb listings. On average, long-term rental supply is reduced by 0.49% if Airbnb
is allowed. The average net impact of Airbnb on a renter is negative and equal to $3,312
(present value). In addition, I conduct two other counterfactual experiments. In the first
one, I assume that those listings that violate the multi-dwelling law in NYC leave the
market. In the second experiment, I assume that the maximum number of nights a listing
can be rented is capped at 90 days per year. The counterfactual results suggest that the first
regulation is much more effective in improving long-term renters’ welfare than the second
regulation.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, I describe how this
chapter contributes to the existing literature. Section 2.3 describes the main components of
our data set. In addition, I show some preliminary evidence to support a dynamic setting in
Section 2.4. Sections 2.5-2.6 present the model and estimation method. Section 2.7 contains
the estimation results. Section 2.8 discusses three counterfactual experiments and Section
2.9 concludes.
2.2. Literature Review
This paper contributes to the recent literature on the sharing economy (see Einav et al.
2016 for a review of the sharing economy). In particular, this paper relates to the impact
of the sharing economy on traditional industries.
The sharing economy has affected a number of traditional industries and incumbent firms.
For instance, Zervas et al. (2017) study the impact of Airbnb’s entry on hotels in Texas
7
and find that Airbnb mildly cannibalizes hotels, with lower price hotels being the most
affected. Li & Srinivasan (2019) discover that Airbnb helps recover the lost demand due to
seasonal hotel pricing and even stimulates more demand in some cities. They also study how
incumbent hotels with fixed capacity should respond. Besides Airbnb, studies also focus on
another form of sharing economy, such as Uber. Berger et al. (2018) find that incumbent
taxi drivers experienced a relative earnings decline of approximately 10% subsequent to
Uber’s entry into a new market.
Directly related to the context of this paper, studies have examined Airbnb’s impact on
the housing market. Lee (2016) and Gurran & Phibbs (2017) provide descriptive analyses
of Airbnb and the rental housing market in Los Angeles and Sydney, Australia, respec-
tively. Other studies focus on how home-sharing affects housing prices and rents. Using
a comprehensive dataset covering the U.S., Barron et al. (2018) find that a 10% increase
in Airbnb listings leads to a 0.42% increase in rents and a 0.76% increase in house prices.
Other studies focus on a particular city. Horn & Merante (2017) find that a one-standard-
deviation increase in Airbnb listings is associated with an increase in asking rents of 0.4%
in Boston. Sheppard & Udell (2016) find that doubling the total number of Airbnb listings
within 300 meters of a house is associated with an increase in house prices of 6% to 9%
in New York City. Kim et al. (2019) uses a structural model and find that imposing a
tax has a greater impact than restricting the number of days an apartment can be listed.
Calder-Wang (2019) uses a static model to study the distributional impact of Airbnb on
the rental market. Almagro & Domınguez-Iino (2019) leverage a restricted dataset in the
Netherlands to study the endogenous amenities choices using Airbnb as a shifter.
This paper contributes to the literature by studying the impact of Airbnb on the rental
supply, housing affordability and its policy implications. While other studies mostly provide
descriptive analysis or use a static model, this paper leverages data on both Airbnb and
rental markets. It uses a dynamic structural model to describe the behavior of the renters.
The framework allows me to understand the underlying trade-offs faced by renters. The
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results have policy implications regarding short-term rental regulations.
Finally, the paper contributes to the literature on dynamic sorting models. Bayer et al.
(2016) is the first paper that estimates a dynamic model of location choice with hetero-
geneous households where households value price, racial composition, pollution, and crime
rate. More recently, Davis et al. (2017), Davis et al. (2018), and Diamond et al. (2019)
estimate a dynamic discrete choice model of location choice to evaluate the effects of hous-
ing vouchers, low-income housing, and rent controls, respectively. This paper adds to their
work by including the potential income from listing on Airbnb that are valued by residents
when making residential decisions.
2.3. Data
The data used to estimate the model come from several different sources. First, I scrape
all listings on Airbnb in NYC. The time span of the data is from 2015 to 2018. In this
dataset, I have detailed listing attributes, location information, price, and the number
of occupied nights. Second, I utilize the data from Infogroup, which provides detailed
information on household tenure status (renter or owner), location, house attributes and
demographic information. The unique ID in the Infogroup data allows me to keep track of
the household’s moving decision. This feature is essential for the dynamic location choice
model. I also supplement the analysis with ACS (American Community Survey) data. The
ACS data allows me to verify the quality of the Infogroup data and to estimate the cost of
switching between the long-term rental market and Airbnb.
Table 1 shows that the average daily rate of Airbnb in NYC in 2015 is $156. The average
daily rates for “entire apartment and “shared apartment are $213 and $89 respectively. The
long-term average monthly rent during the same period is $1,431. From 2015 to 2018, the
average growth rate of the number of hosts on Airbnb is about 9.3%, while the average
growth rate of long-term rent is 2.8%. Figure 2 demonstrates the distribution of Airbnb
hosts in NYC. The red dots represent hosts with entire apartments and the green dots
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Table 1: Average Airbnb Daily Rate and Rent








































% of Renter-occupied Unit
in the Sample
68.9% 69.2% 68.5% 69.4%
Standard deviations are in the parenthesis. All, Entire and Shared represent all
Airbnb listing, “entire apartment” and “shared apartment”. The monthly rent
is calculated from the Infogroup data.
represent hosts with shared apartments. From this figure, one can observe that “entire
apartment” concentrates in lower Manhattan, the west end of Queens and the north-east end
of Brooklyn. The “shared apartment” dominates in other regions such as upper Manhattan,
Bronx, and the rest of Queens and Brooklyn. Those regions with more “entire apartment”
are also the regions with a relatively larger white population and higher income. Table 2 is
the staying and moving probability from 2015-2018. The majority of the long-term renters
choose to stay with their current choice (more than 80%). Around 1% of the renters move
out of the city, and 16% of the renters move to other neighborhoods. Only 2% of the renters
choose to move within their current neighborhood.
Since the analysis in this paper relies on the moving decision of renters in NYC, the accuracy
of the data is of paramount importance. The data I use to infer the moving history is
from Infogroup2. The company collects individual data through several different sources
such as new utility connections and changes, real estate tax assessments and deed transfers,
voter registrations, credit card billing statements, individual-level transactional data, public
2https://www.infogroup.com/
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Figure 2: Airbnb Listings in New York City 2015
The red dots represent “entire apartment” listings and the green dots represent “shared apartment”
listings
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Table 2: Staying and Moving Frequency (2015-2018)
2015 2016 2017 2018
Stay 80.4% 81.2% 80.8% 81.0%
Move
Within Neighborhood
2.3% 2.1% 2.6% 2.2%
Move
Across Neighborhoods
16.2% 15.8% 15.7% 15.8%
Move Out 1.1% 0.9% 0.9% 1.0%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
records, telephone white pages directories, and proprietary enrichment sources. In Table 3,
I compare the data from Infogroup (2015) with the ACS 2015 1-year estimates. The results
show that in several key variables like income, race and rent, the data from Infogroup is
close to the ACS data.
2.3.1. Dynamic Behavior
When making moving decisions, long-term renters will take into account how the new
destination affects their future utility. The dynamic consideration is crucial to the accuracy
of the analysis. Before I present the detail of the model, I use this section to motivate the
inclusion of the dynamic consideration of long-term renters’ location choices. The dynamic
consideration is driven by two factors. The first factor is the expectation about how the
location characteristics, such as price and number of Airbnb listings, evolve over time. If
Airbnb is available and becomes an option for long-term renters to share their apartments,
long-term renters might move to a location where rent is relatively high, but the potential
return from Airbnb is also high. The return from Airbnb could offset the loss in utility
resulting from choosing a location with costly rent. As a result, long-term renters will
consider expectations about future utility streams when deciding where to live, making
trade-offs between current and future utilities.
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Table 3: Comparison between Inforgroup and ACS Data







































Median Rent ($) 1,298 1,255 43
Standard errors of the means are in the parentheses.
The second factor is the moving cost. Because of the moving cost, it is costly for a renter
to re-optimize every period. The moving cost has two components. The first one is related
to the size of the apartment. For instance, moving out of an apartment with 3 bedrooms is
more costly than moving out of a one-bedroom apartment. The second component is the
length of occupancy. The length of occupancy can measure long-term renter’s tendency to
the current choice. As the length of occupancy accumulates over time, it may become more
costly for a renter to move to other places.
The sorting literature on location decision provides several pieces of evidence that support
the forward-looking assumption in people’s location choice. For instance, Case et al. (2012)
use survey evidence collected over decades to characterize household expectations for future
house price changes. They conclude that households systematically expect house prices to
continue to move in the same direction in the near term. Bayer et al. (2016) use real estate
and mortgage data to show households are forward-looking when they are deciding where
to locate. Bayer et al. (2016) also demonstrate that ignoring the dynamic consideration
13





































* 90% ** 95% *** 99%. The dependent variable is the choice
probability calculated from the data.
could bias the estimation of preference.
To demonstrate that expectation about future and moving costs might matter for long-
term renter location decisions, I use simple exercises that can show preliminary, model-free
evidence of forward-looking behavior. First, I examine how the location choice probabilities
vary with both contemporaneous and lagged rental price, Airbnb price and Airbnb share.
In Table 4, column (2) is the result with lagged rental price, Airbnb price and Airbnb share.
This result shows that long-tern renters will consider both the current state of a location and
the recent change in that location. In particular, long-term renters care about the long-run
trend of rental price and Airbnb price but value the recent change in Airbnb share since
the sign of the lagged Airbnb percentage is the opposite of the current Airbnb percentage.
Second, the persistent pattern of long-term renters to stay in their current location (Table
2) over time suggests that moving costs may play a crucial role in renters’ moving decisions.
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However, if long-term renters’ unobserved preference shocks are persistent over time, this
can also generate such a moving pattern. In order to support the moving cost setting, I
estimate a simple location choice model
uij,t = Xj,tβ − αpj,t + γj + λt + ξj,t
where uij,t is the indirect utility of renter i to choose option j, Xj,t is the j specific charac-
teristics, pj,t is rental price, γj and λt are choice specific effect and time effect, and ξj,t is the
unobserved preference shock. If moving is costly and the moving cost enters into renter’s
utility linearly, using the moving probability conditional on moving should yield a different
result if the unconditional probability is used. Assuming ξj,t follows type I extreme value
distribution, I show the results in Table 5. The results suggest that moving cost affects
renter’s moving decision. If the moving cost is sufficiently large, we should expect that
the magnitude of the coefficients using unconditional probability would be less than those
using conditional probability. Although such a static setting may not provide a consistent
estimation of the parameters, it can serve as a piece of evidence to support the modeling
of moving costs. If there is no moving cost, conditional on moving or not should provide
similar results even though the estimates themselves are not correct.
The results in this section are preliminary evidence of long-term renters’ dynamic consid-
erations when they are making location choices. In the counterfactual, I will further show
the estimation bias when forward-looking is ignored.
2.3.2. Airbnb’s Impact on Rent
The main focus of this paper is the impact of Airbnb on long-term renters. If Airbnb does
cannibalize the supply of long-term rentals, it will increase the rental prices. Before moving
to the structural model, I want to show some model-free evidence of how the number of
Airbnb listing affects the long-term rental price. I use the following regression equation:
15



































* 90% ** 95% *** 99%. The first column is the result conditional on moving and
the second column is the result without conditional on moving. If there is no moving
cost, these two columns should provide similar results.
log rj,t = α logN
E
j,t + β logN
S
j,t + γXj,t + λt + ξj + εj,t
where rj,t is the monthly rent at location j in year t. N
E
j,t is the number of Airbnb listing
with “entire apartment while NSj,t is the number of Airbnb listing with “shared apartment.
Xj,t is the location-related attributes, λt is the time fixed effect, and ξj is the location
fixed effect. These two fixed effects control the unobserved time trend and unobserved
choice specific characteristics. They can be identified by the cross-sectional variations and
intertemporal variations, respectively. However, I am not able to rule out the fact that
there exists an unobserved time trend that can vary across different choices. Moreover,
this choice-varying time trend could be correlated with the number of Airbnb listings.
Therefore I use instrumental variables to control for the potential endogeneity of the number
of Airbnb listing. Using a similar method specified in Barron et al. (2018), I use Worldwide
Google Search Index for Airbnbt×Number of Hotel2012 and Worldwide Google Search Index
for Airbnbt×Number of restaurant2012 as IVs. The data on the number of hotels and
restaurants is from Infogroup Business (Academic Level).
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Figure 3: Worldwide Google Index for Airbnb and Airbnb Listings Number in New York
City 2015-2018
The validity of the IVs comes from the following two considerations. First, the Worldwide
Google Search Index for Airbnb is related to information diffusion and technological im-
provements to Airbnbs platform as it matures as a company. The growth of Airbnb listings
number is positively correlated with the worldwide Google search index for Airbnb. This is
also true for the Airbnb listings number in NYC (Figure 3). Since the Worldwide Google
Search Index for Airbnb measures the global interest in Airbnb, it should not correlate
with the local level unobserved shock. Second, I further interact the Worldwide Google
Search Index for Airbnb with two measures of local attractiveness, the number of hotels
and restaurants. These two variables are in the year 2012, when Airbnb started to grow
rapidly. The intuition here is that if the trend of the rental prices is similar before 2012,
then the instrumental variables are unlikely to correlate with the unobserved time trend
that can vary across different locations. This argument depends on the assumption rental
prices have parallel trends before 2012, which can be tested.
Table 6 shows that a 1% increase in the number of “entire apartment” on Airbnb leads to
a 0.03% increase in the long-term rent. Meanwhile, a 1% increase in the number of “shared
apartment” on Airbnb leads to a 0.02% increase in the long-term rent. This number is
17




















* 90% ** 95% *** 99%. N (entire) is the number of Airbnb
listings with “entire apartment” type and N (shared) is the
number of Airbnb listings with “’shared apartment’ type
of a reasonable magnitude compared to the results in the literature (Barron et al. 2018;
Almagro & Domınguez-Iino 2019). The result in Table 6 also suggests that the unobserved
choice-varying time trend is negatively correlated with the number of Airbnb listings.
I interpret this model-free analysis as suggestive evidence that neighborhoods with more
Airbnb listings experience trends that make them less attractive to residents. A structural
model detailed in section 2.4 takes into account both the rent channel suggested in this
section and the income channel (listing on Airbnb). With both these channels, I show a
complete picture of the impact of Airbnb on long-term renters.
2.4. Model Description
To understand how Airbnb and the associated regulation affect the renters in the market,
I build a structural model which specifies long-term renter’s location decisions, long-term
renter’s decisions to enter into Airbnb as “shared apartment”, landlord’s decisions to list
their apartment on Airbnb or on the long-term rental market, the demand on Airbnb and
how rent and Airbnb price are determined.
Long-term renter’s location choices determine the demand for long-term rental. When
making their location choices, renters may take Airbnb into consideration since Airbnb
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may provide them an alternative source of income. If a location attracts a large amount
of Airbnb demand, moving to this location could potentially be beneficial. Specifying the
demand on Airbnb allows me to model renter’s expectations on how much they can earn
through the platform. Even though renters choose to share their apartments with tourists,
their behavior would not affect the rental stock. On the other hand, if a landlord decides
to list his apartment on Airbnb as “entire apartment” instead of on the long-term rental
market, this behavior does reduce the rental stock. Therefore, both renter’s and landlord’s
decisions of entering into Airbnb determine the total supply on the platform. In contrast,




In this section, I model how households make their residential housing choices. Households
are making a sequence of location decisions that maximize the discounted sum of expected
utilities. Let di,t denote the decision variable that determines which location household i
moves to at time t. If a household decides to move, the decision is dLi,t = j ∈ {0, 1, ..., J}
where j indicates the location-room type choice and J is the total number of options. To
avoid zero observation in the estimation, I allow a long-term renter to choose among 55
PUMAs (Public Use Microdata Areas) and 3 room type with 1 bedroom, 2 bedrooms, and
more than 3 bedrooms. In total, there are 167 choices (165 moving choices + 1 outside
option + 1 not moving). If a household chooses to stay in the same unit, then dLi,t = J + 1.
The outside option dLi,t = 0 indicates that the household moves out of the city. Under
this setting, I can distinguish the following two cases: 1) moving to another apartment but
within the same location, and 2) staying in the same unit.
Let uLij,t be the indirect utility of household i to choose option j at time t. si,t is the state
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variable. Therefore, the value function of household i can be written as:
V (si,t) = max
j
{uLij,t + βE[V (si,t+1)|si,t, dLi,t = j]}
I assume that the indirect period utility can be decomposed as
uLij,t = ū
L
ij,t + εij,t if j = J + 1
uLij,t = ū
L
ij,t − costit + εij,t if j 6= J + 1 (2.1)
where costit is the moving cost that enters into the utility linearly and εij,t follow type I





2i − αLi (pj,t − πj,t) + ξLj,t (2.2)
where Xj,t is the characteristics of option j at time t, nj,t is the share of Airbnb listings
among all the rental units that belong to option j, pj,t is the average monthly rental price,
πj,t is the expected income from listing their apartments on Airbnb. The reason for including
the share of Airbnb into the utility function is as follow. First, in Section 2.3 I have shown
that the number of Airbnb listings is positively correlated with the rental price. Second,
long-term renters have the tendency to avoid locations with many Airbnb listings. Because
a community populated with Airbnb listings may, not only witness higher rental price, but
also have noise and safety issues. Although long-term renters might dislike locations with
high concentration of Airbnb listings, they can potentially benefit from Airbnb if they share
their own apartments with travellers. This extra benefit would reduce the rental cost. If
a long-term renter decides to move, she/he will incur a moving cost that is related to the
size of the apartment and the length of her/his occupancy. The moving cost costit has the
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following specification
costit = m1i ∗ typei +m2i ∗ lengthit +m3i ∗ length2it
where typei indicates the number of bedroom and lengthit is the length of occupancy at
the original location.
The state variables of the system include the current location dLi,t−1, current length of
stay lengthit, rental price pj,t, expected Airbnb income πj,t, Airbnb percentage nj,t and
the idiosyncratic shock εij,t, si,t = {dLi,t−1, lengthit, n·,t, p·,t, π·,t, εi·,t}. Among all the state
variables, dLi,t−1 and lengthit evolve deterministically. nj,t, pj,t and πj,t are global states
and εij,t is the unobserved preference shock. I assume that states follow a Markov process.
For the simplicity of analysis, I suppress the deterministic state dLi,t−1, lengthit and let
s̄i,t = {n·,t, p·,t, π·,t}. I also make the following assumption:
Assumption 1 (Conditional independence assumption). The transition probability of the
states can be factored into the following form
q(s̄′, ε′ | s̄, ε, d) = qs(s̄′ | s̄, d)qε(ε′)
Let vj(s̄i,t) be the choice specific value function subtracting the idiosyncratic shock εij,t
and moving cost costit. If the idiosyncratic shock εij,t in Equation (2.1) follow iid Type I












| s̄i,t, dLi,t = j
]
(2.3)
where the expectation is over the future state s̄i,t+1. Let v
i
kj,t = vj(s̄i,t) when d
L
i,t−1 = k,
















where PL,movekj,t is the likelihood of choosing option j conditional on moving and P
L,stay
kJ+1,t is
the likelihood of staying if εij,t follow iid Type I extreme value distribution.
Instead of solving the value function, I use the approach of Hotz and Miller (1993). Note
that Equation (2.4) implies











Using Equation (2.3), I can express vkj,t − vkJ+1,t as













The sum of the last two lines is equal to
βE
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as a direct result from Equation (2.4) and (2.5) where g 6= J+1. Combining Equation (2.6)
and (2.7), the log likelihood of choosing option j conditional on moving can be expressed
as a function of the current period utility function ūLj,t, the moving cost costjt and the
probability of staying and moving. Similarly, the log likelihood of staying is also a func-
tion of the current period utility, the moving cost and probability of staying and moving.
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Therefore, in the estimation, I can recover the current period utility and moving cost using
maximum likelihood by replacing the probability of moving and staying with the empirical
counterparts.
Short Term Demand
The actual demand for Airbnb is sophisticated because each host can only accommodate one
reservation each day. This inventory restriction causes the modeling of demand impractical
unless the rule of allocation of each day is specified. Since this paper only focuses on the
welfare of long-term renters and landlords, I use a relatively parsimonious demand model,
which is used to form the expectation of income from Airbnb.
I assume that the number of booked days of a listing l is a random variable Yl,t. Yl,t follows
a truncated negative binomial distribution. The probability mass function is











where α = θ exp(Z1l,tβ
1S), δ = exp(Z1l,tβ






Unlike the Poisson distribution, the negative binomial distribution has an extra degree of
freedom for dispersion. In Z1l,t, I include a constant, apartment type, number of bedroom,
average Airbnb price of option j, rj,t, average Airbnb price of other location r−j,t. In
addition to the truncated negative binomial distribution that models the number of booked
days, I use a multinomial logit model to model the probability of a listing having positive
number of booked days.








where Z2j,t includes average price, distance to the Penn Station, number of hotel, number
of restaurant and Airbnb percentage. With Equation (2.8) and (2.9), the expected number
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In the specification above, I do not include amenities, because it is impossible to establish a
one-to-one link between Airbnb hosts and the residents that appear in the Infogroup data.
However, the distance, number of hotels and the number of restaurants can still convey
information about the characteristics of the listing. In addition, this specification allows me
to simulate the entry decisions of long-term renters and landlords.
2.4.2. Rental Supply
In general, there are three types of listings on Airbnb. The first one is “entire apartment”.
The landlord of this type does not reside in the apartment, and the guest can have the
entire apartment during her stay. The second type is called “shared apartment”. In this
type of apartment, the guest shares the same apartment with the long-term renter. The
last type of apartment is “private room” where the guest needs to share a room with
other guests or the long-term renter. Since the last type of listings is less than 1% of the
total number of listings, I combine “shared apartment” and “private room”, and call them
“shared apartment”. Since the landlord is not in “entire apartment”, the supply of this
type of listing is by absentee landlords. Similarly, the supply of “shared apartment” is by
the long-term renters.
Absentee Landlord
An absentee landlord can list the apartment as “entire apartment” on Airbnb. This type
of apartment will be subtracted from the supply of the long-term rental market and added
to the short-term rental market. Absentee landlords choose to rent their apartments in the
traditional long-term market to locals, or in the short-term rental market to travelers. The
landlord’s problem, choosing to list either on the long-term (L), the short-term (S) rental
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market or the outside option (O) is given by:
πAj,t = max{12 · pj,t + vLj,t, Aj,t − cSj,t + vSj,t, vOj,t}
where pj,t is the average monthly rent, Aj,t is the expected income from Airbnb and c
S
j,t is












the unobservable associated with each choice. Under the specification of Airbnb demand
in Section 2.5.1, Aj,t = δ̄rj,t. δ̄ is the conditional mean of the demand distribution, which
is specified in Equation (2.10). If the rent is high, landlords would have inventive to list
their apartment on the long-term rental market. If the expected return from Airbnb is
high, landlords may switch to Airbnb. Otherwise, if both rent and Airbnb return are low,
landlords may choose to leave the apartment empty. Suppose vLj,t v
S
j,t follow type I extreme
value distribution. Hence, the probabilities for these two choices are:
PLj,t =
exp(12 · pj,t)
1 + exp(12 · pj,t) + exp(Aj,t − cSj,t)
PSj,t =
exp(Aj,t − cSj,t)
1 + exp(12 · pj,t) + exp(Aj,t − cSj,t)
POj,t =
1
1 + exp(12 · pj,t) + exp(Aj,t − cSj,t)
I can map the observed market share of Airbnb listings to the probabilities above and
recover the cost parameters.
Apartment Sharing
In New Your City, 54% of the listings on Airbnb are “entire apartment” that are provided
by absentee landlords. The other 46% listings are provided by the long-term renters. Long-
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term renters share their apartments with tourists and travellers. Since long-term renters
still reside in their apartments, their decisions on listing their apartments on Airbnb do not
affect the supply of long-term rental directly. Listing on Airbnb could be costly. Therefore,
if the expected return from Airbnb is higher than not sharing, long-term renters might join
the platform. Long-term renter’s problem can be written as:
πRj,t = max{Bj,t − cSSj,t + g1j,t, g0j,t} (2.12)
where Bj,t is the expected return from Airbnb and c
SS














If the error in Equation (2.12) follows type 1 extreme value distribution, the probability of
choosing to list on Airbnb is
PSSj,t =
exp(Bj,t − cSSj,t )
1 + exp(Bj,t − cSSj,t )
Similar to the cost for absentee landlords, I can map the observed share of shared apart-
ment among long-term renters to the above probability to recover the cost parameters for
apartment sharing.
2.4.3. Rental Price and Airbnb Price
The long-term rental market is characterized by a sorting equilibrium. The equilibrium
price vector pj,t for all bedroom-location combinations ensures that the demand for each
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type j equals its supply
DL({pj,t}, {rj,t}) = SL({pj,t}, {rj,t}) (2.14)
Specifically, the demand of long-term rental is














and the supply of long-term rental is
SL({pj,t}, {rj,t}) = MjPLj,t =
Mj exp(12 · pj,t)
1 + exp(12 · pj,t) + exp(Aj,t − cSj,t)
Mj is the number of all units, N1 is the market size
3 and πjt(i) is the density of type
i long-term renters. Similarly, in the short-term rental market, the demand is equal to
supply
DS({pj,t}, {rj,t}) = SS({pj,t}, {rj,t}) (2.16)
where
DS({pj,t}, {rj,t}) = MjPLj,tPSSj,t +MjPSj,t
=
Mj exp(12 · pj,t)
1 + exp(12 · pj,t) + exp(Aj,t − cSj,t)
exp(Bj,t − cSSj,t )
1 + exp(Bj,t − cSSj,t )
+
Mj exp(Aj,t − cSj,t)
1 + exp(12 · pj,t) + exp(Aj,t − cSj,t)
(2.17)
and







3The entire market includes counties that surround New York City, namely Hudson, Nassau, Westchester,
and Bergen.
27
and N2 is the market size.Therefore, Section 2.5.1 to 2.5.3 define the all the necessary
components that characterise the equilibrium of both the long-term and short-term rental
market.
2.5. Estimation
To account for the heterogeneity of renters, I classify households into different groups. Each
group is defined by a renter’s income level and race. In the estimation, I divide the income
level of renter into 4 groups: 1) less than 25K, 2) between 25K and 50K, 3) between 50K
and 100K and 4) above 100K. Within each income group, I also consider the race of the
renter as either white or non-white. In total, there are 8 different groups.
The model primitives include the parameters of the utility functions Equation (2.2) as
well as the cost functions in Equation (2.11) and (2.13). The discount factor β is set to
0.95. The estimation proceeds in multiple stages. First, I use the household location and
mobility decision to recover the current period utility and moving cost. Second, given the
decomposition in Equation (2.2), I can recover the parameters in the utility function. Third,
I can use the choice decisions by the Airbnb renters to recover the parameters in the short-
term demand function. Lastly, the variation of the share of long-term renters and Airbnb
listings helps identify the cost functions.
2.5.1. The Long Term Demand
Recall that conditional on moving, if the error term εij,t follows the type I extreme value





































The moving cost represents the amount a household would pay to avoid moving to a ran-
domly chosen neighborhood in a randomly chosen time period. With both the likelihood of










In Section 2.5.1, I have shown that the conditional moving probability and the probability for
staying can be expressed as a function of model parameters and empirical choice probability







vkj,t − vkJ+1,t = ūLj,t − ūLk,t + β
(








Similarly, the log probability of staying can be written as






The empirical probability P̂L,movejg,t+1 and P̂
L,stay
jJ+1,t+1 can be calculated directly from the data.
However, in some locations, the number of renters choosing a specific choice may be small.
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This issue could cause a small sample problem in the estimation. I use a kernel smoothing
method to make sure that, for each moving probability, there are at least 30 observations.
The detail is in the Appendix.
For the purpose of identification, I normalize the flow utility of the outside option to 0. I
also normalize the moving cost from the outside option to the inside option to 0. With
the estimated ˆ̄uLij,t from the maximum likelihood estimation, I can recover the parameters
in the utility function specified in Equation (2.2). Simple OLS regression can achieve the
goal. However, the rent, the expected return from Airbnb and the Airbnb percentage in
the utility function might be correlated with some unobserved factor included in the error
term. In order to account for the potential endogeneity, I use the average adjusted rent (rent
minuses expected Airbnb income) in the previous year in all the adjacent locations with the
same bedroom number as an instrumental variable. This instrumental variable is correlated
with the rent since the IV is also constructed from surrounding apartments’ rental prices.
In addition, the IV does not affect the current period demand directly because it is from the
previous period. In addition, I use (Worldwide Google Search Index for Airbnbt)×(Number
of Hotel2012) and (Worldwide Google Search Index for Airbnbt)×(Number of restaurants
2012) as IVs for Airbnb share. The validity of these IVs is discussed in Section 2.3.
2.5.2. The Short Term Demand
Since the short-term demand is static, I can use actual occupancy detail to recover the
parameters. A listing l′s number of occupied nights is Yl,t. The probability mass function
is










where α = θ exp(Z1l,tβ
1S) and δ = exp(Z1l,tβ







log f(Yl,t | Yl,t > 0)
The parameters β2S in Equation (2.9) are estimated using the share of Airbnb listing.
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2.5.3. Rental Supply
The absentee landlords need to choose whether to list their apartments on Airbnb. Suppose
vLj,t and v
S




1 + exp(12 · pj,t) + exp(Aj,t − cSj,t)
PSj,t =
exp(Aj,t − cSj,t)
+1 exp(12 · pj,t) + exp(Aj,t − cSj,t)
POj,t =
1
1 + exp(12 · pj,t) + exp(Aj,t − cSj,t)
Using the market share of each choice of landlords, I can recover the cost associated with
switching between the long-term and short-term markets. Let sLj,t and s
S
j,t denote the market
share of each of the three choices, then
log sLj,t − log sOj,t = 12 · pj,t −Aj,t + cSj,t (2.18)
log sSj,t − log sOj,t = Aj,t − cSj,t (2.19)
The operation cost cSj,t can be recovered by minimizing the difference between the left-hand
side and the right-hand side of Equation (2.19) and (2.19).
Similarly, the variation of market share of “shared apartment” among all the renter-occupied
listings can help identify the cost for long-term renters to choose to list on Airbnb. If the
error in Equation (2.12) follows type 1 extreme value distribution, the probability of choosing
to list on Airbnb is
PSSj,t =
exp(Bj,t − cSSj,t )
1 + exp(Bj,t − cSSj,t )
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With the probabilities specified above and the corresponding, I can match the probability
with the market share to recover the cost parameters. Let sSSj,t be the market share “shared
apartment”, then sSj,t denote the market share of each of the three choices, then
log sSSj,t − log(1− sSSj,t ) = Bj,t − cSSj,t + νj,t
where νj,t is the error. c
SS
j,t can be estimated using a simple OLS regression.
2.6. Results
This section provides the results of the estimation. I first show the results of long-term de-
mand. There are 8 different renter groups according to income and race combination. Table
7 shows that renters with higher incomes are less price sensitive. Conditional on the income
level, non-white renters are more price-sensitive than white renters. The price coefficients
for all the income-race combinations are intuitive and in the right direction. Using the
price coefficients, one can also examine renter’s willingness to pay to other amenities such
as the number of bedrooms and the distance to the center of the city. For instance, a white
renter who earns less than 25K per year is willing to pay about $626 for a one-bedroom
apartment, and $710 for an apartment with 2 bedrooms. A non-white renter who earns
between 50K-100K per year will pay $809 for a one-bedroom apartment. The willingness
to pay of this type of renters is less than the renters with the same income level but in a
different race group ($903). The sign of the estimates and the differences between different
income group are reasonable and compatible with intuition.
Together with the demand estimates, I also estimate the cost of moving with different
income-race groups. Table 8 shows that the moving cost is positively related to the number
of bedrooms. The cost of moving is also related to several different factors. Since this paper
only focuses on one city, the distance between the two locations does play an important role
in moving. More realistically, the moving cost is closely related to the number of bedrooms


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































moving cost is also a function of the length of occupancy at a renter’s original location. In
Table 8, one can observe that renters with higher incomes have smaller moving costs, while
non-white renters have higher moving costs than white renters. This result reflects the fact
that high income or white renters are more likely to move than low income or non-white
renters. Applying the price coefficients estimated in the long-term demand function, I can
calculate the moving cost in dollar value. For example, a non-white renter with 25K-50K
earning moving out of a two-bedroom apartment that she/he has been living in for one
year needs to pay $1,878 while a white renter within the same income group and length of
occupancy needs to pay $1,829 for moving. Moreover, a white renter earning 100K+ needs
to pay $1,210 to move out of her/his one-year-long two-bedroom apartment.
In the moving cost function, the sign of the quadratic term Length2 is negative, which
means that the moving cost is increasing and then decreasing in the length of staying in
one choice. Long-term renters are likely to move if they only stay in a place for a short
time. However, as time accumulates, renters are less likely to move because they may have
established a stable connection with the location. Since few renters will stay in one location
forever, the moving cost eventually diminishes to reflect this fact.
In Table 9, I show the estimation result of the short-term demand function that is modeled
via a negative binomial distribution. The sign of the daily rate is in the right direction. A
listing with “entire apartment” type has a higher number of occupied days on average. Table
9 also shows that a one-bedroom apartment is more popular than other apartment types.
The number of restaurants within a neighborhood has a positive impact on the probability
that a listing has positive occupied days while the number of hotels has a negative impact
on such probability.
The last part of the estimation is the cost associated with operating on Airbnb. Table 10
shows the cost estimates for different Airbnb listing types. The first column is the cost
of “entire apartment” and the second column is “shared apartment”. All the results in
Table 10 are in dollar value. For instance, a non-white renter with income 25K-50K will
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Table 8: Moving Cost Estimation

































































































* 90% ** 95% *** 99%.
Table 9: Short-term Demand Estimation


































Price of other Airbnb
.075*
(.041)
* 90% ** 95% *** 99%. Location effect and time effect are included.
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Table 10: Airbnb Operation Cost
Cost of Entire Apartment
($/month)






























































* 90% ** 95% *** 99%.
incur a cost of $1,987/month to operate a “shared apartment” listing while he needs to pay
$4,132/month to operate an “entire apartment” listing if he is a landlord. The estimated
cost of Airbnb operation is high compared to the monthly rent ($1,432 in 2015). This is
also the reason why the total number of Airbnb listings is small compared to the number
of total available units in NYC (around 2%).
Dynamic versus Static Consideration
In section 2.4, I have shown some preliminary evidence of the dynamic consideration of
long-term renters. Given the estimates from the dynamic model, I compare the results with
a model in a static assumption. If the true model is dynamic, specifying a static model
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creates an omitted variables problem. In a dynamic setting, current rental price, Airbnb
price and Airbnb share affect current period utility and they help predict future utility. A
static model omits the second effect. In particular, if higher values of a given characteristic
predict lower future utility, then the coefficients will be biased towards negative infinity. If
higher values predict higher future utility, the coefficient is biased towards positive infinity
under a static model. The actual direction of the bias depends on how the characteristics
evolve over time.
Table 11 reports the comparison between the static models and the dynamic model for all
8 types of long-term renters. The first three rows in Table 11 are rent coefficients for the
dynamic and two static models. The first static model includes moving costs and the second
one does not. The results show that a static model with moving costs overestimates the
rent sensitivity across all income and racial groups. Since rent is persistent over time, the
static model attributes future value loss to the current increase in the rental price, thus
overestimates the price responsiveness. The second static model does not include moving
costs. This model represents the case when a renter’s previous choice is not available,
thus modeling the moving cost is impossible. In this case, a static model underestimates
the magnitude of the price coefficient. As I discuss in section 2.3, the actual direction of
the bias caused by a static model is ambiguous. If the moving cost is sufficiently large,
a static model without moving cost could bias the estimates towards zeros, which is the
case in Table 11. As for the coefficient of Airbnb share, the static model with moving cost
overestimates the coefficient and the static model without moving cost underestimates the
coefficient for the same reason as rental price. The result in Table 11 indicates that if a static
model is utilized to analyze the impact of Airbnb on long-term renters, the result could be






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In this section, I first evaluate the impact of Airbnb by shutting down the platform entirely.
Under this setting, neither landlord or long-term renter has the option to list on Airbnb.
Second, given the model estimates, I also evaluate the impact of a series of policies intended
to ensure the supply and affordability of rental housing. There are two types of policies.
The first one is related to the multi-dwelling regulation that is widely discussed in NYC.
According to the multiple dwelling law in NYC, it is illegal to rent out one’s apartment
to others less than 30 days if the permanent tenant does not reside in the apartment,
except that the building only has less or equal to three single-family units. In NYC, 63%
of the residential buildings have more than three units. In fact, around 81% of the “entire
apartment” units listed on Airbnb are illegal. In this policy experiment, I evaluate the
impact of eliminating all the potential illegal units. The second policy is restricting the
total number of nights a listing can be rented. I will impose a series of night caps on the
current Airbnb market and analyze the effect of such a policy.
2.7.1. Solution Method
Before I show the results of the counterfactual analysis, I outline the solution method for
the model in this subsection. In the estimation, the conditional choice probability (CCP)
approach can avoid solving the dynamic programming problem. In the counterfactual anal-
ysis, however, I need to calculate the new equilibrium which requires solving the model.
The main hurdle in solving the equilibrium is the dimension of the state space. In general,
each long-term renter needs to form an expectation about the future states based on the
current states. Since there are 165 choices with 3 states (rental price, Airbnb price, share
of Airbnb) in each choice, the problem is not tractable without further assumption. In
order to circumvent the exploding state space problem, I assume that rental price, Airbnb
price, share of Airbnb evolve deterministically. Therefore I can compute deterministic state
transitions without integrating over a high-dimensional space of states. I assume that the
growth rates of rent, Airbnb price and Airbnb share are approximated by the following
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three equations
∆ log pj,t = ρ0 + ρ1∆ log pj,t−1 + ρ3∆ log rj,t−1 + ρ4∆ log nj,t−1 (2.20)
∆ log rj,t = γ0 + γ1∆ log pj,t−1 + γ3∆ log rj,t−1 + γ4∆ log nj,t−1 (2.21)
∆ log nj,t = o0 + o1∆ log pj,t−1 + o3∆ log rj,t−1 + o4∆ log nj,t−1 (2.22)
In these equations, pj,t, rj,t and nj,t are rental price, Airbnb price and Airbnb share re-
spectively. The parameters (ρ, γ, o) in Equation (2.20)-(2.22) are not the model primitives.
In particular, (ρ, γ, o) depend on the model parameters and the equilibrium. This type of
approximation is widely used to model the belief of an agent in a dynamic setting (Krusell
& Smith 1998; Lee & Wolpin 2010). The transition equations (2.20)-(2.22) offer the follow-
ing three advantages. First, the transition equations provide predictions that allow me to
construct future value for each long-term renter. Second, this approach captures the inter-
action among rental price, Airbnb price, and Airbnb share in a parsimonious way. Third,
this approach allows me to generate counterfactual rents, Airbnb prices, and Airbnb share
in a relatively simple way4.
With the approximation of the state transition, the solution method used in this paper is
summarized in the following steps. Let η = (ρ, γ, o) denote the parameters that govern the
processes in Equation (2.20)-(2.22). Given the model primitives and the initial value of η,
η0, the model can be calculated in the following steps:
1. Given the inial value of pj,1, rj,1 and nj,1, calculate the choice specific value function
with the transitions in Equation (2.20)-(2.22) and η0
2. Calculate the long-term rental demand using the choice specific value function in step
1 at t = 1.
4The parameters of the AR(1) process are not the model primitives; thus they can change under different
counterfactual regimes
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Table 12: Long-term Rental Supply Change
One Bedroom Two Bedroom Three Bedroom+







Standard deviation in the parenthesis




j,1 using the marketing clearing conditions in Equa-
tion (2.14) and (2.16)






j,1 and repeat step 1-3 until convergence
5. Repeat step 1-4 for t=2,...,T where T is the number of sample periods.
6. Use Equation (2.20)-(2.22) to estimate new parameters η∗
7. End the procedure if η∗ and η0 are close, otherwise replace η0 with η
∗ and go back to
step 1
The details of the solution method is provided in the Appendix.
2.7.2. Experiment 1: Impact of Airbnb
This exercise is to help understand the impact of Airbnb on the long-term rental market.
Given the model estimates, I simulate the model without the option of Airbnb. Under this
setting, landlords do not have the choice to list their apartments on Airbnb. As for the
long-term renters, they no longer have the choice to share their apartments with others. Let
NNo Airbnb and NAirbnb denote the available long-term rental units in the city. Therefore,
(NAirbnb −NNo Airbnb)/NNo Airbnb is the percentage change in the long-term rental supply.
Table 12 shows that Airbnb reduces the supply of one-bedroom apartments by 0.78%, two-
bedroom apartments by 0.49% and three-bedroom and above by 0.19%. Regardless of the
number of bedrooms, Airbnb reduces the long-term rental supply by 0.49% with substantial
variation across neighborhoods in NYC. Figure 4 shows that locations with denser Airbnb
listings have greater supply reduction.
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Figure 4: Long-term Rental Supply Change across Locations
I also calculate the welfare change of the renters. Table 13 shows the welfare change with
respect to each income-race group. Renters with higher incomes incur a more significant
impact from Airbnb’s entry because a high-income renter is more likely to list her/his
apartment on Airbnb. Meanwhile, white renters suffer more than non-white renters if
Airbnb enters into the market. This is because an Airbnb listing owner is more likely to be
white, even though non-white renters are more price-sensitive than white renters. Figure 5
demonstrates the geographic distribution of the change in the welfare of renters. Intuitively,
Airbnb has a greater negative impact on locations with more Airbnb listings.
2.7.3. Experiment 2: Multi-Dwelling Law
In this section, I will evaluate the impact of the multi-dwelling law on renters. According
to the law, the occupant of an apartment is not allowed to rent out his/her apartment to
others less than 30 days if he/she does not reside in the apartment. This law does not apply
to the building or house with less than 3 families. In NYC, 63% of the residential buildings
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Figure 5: Welfare Change across Locations (Introduce Airbnb)
have more or equal to 3 families. Under the classification of the multi-dwelling law, around
81% of the “entire apartment” listings are illegal. Hence, I will eliminate all the illegal
listings on Airbnb and evaluate its impact on long-term renters. Table 14 shows the policy
impact for each income-race group. Similar to the first experiment, higher income or white
renters benefit most from this policy. The elimination of the illegal listings results in higher
long-term rental supply. Figure 6 shows the welfare change across different locations. Since
most illegal listings concentrate on the south-west side of Manhattan and the west side of
Queens, eliminating those illegal listing has a more significant impact on those areas.
2.7.4. Experiment 3: Night Cap
The last experiment to explore is the night cap policy. Night cap policy is implemented in
several states to restrict the operation of Airbnb. The policy generally imposes a restriction
on the total number of days a listing owner can rent out her apartment. For example,
San Francisco does not allow Airbnb listing owners to rent out their apartments more
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Figure 6: Welfare Change across Locations (Multi-Dwelling Law)
than 90 days within a year. To implement the experiment, I assume that a listing owner,
regardless of listing type, can only rent out her apartment less than 90 days in a year. In
this experiment, the distribution of the number of occupied days (Equation 2.8) is truncated
at 90.
Table 15 illustrates the welfare changes under the night cap policy. The effect of the night
cap policy is much smaller than the multi-dwelling law. Since the average number of booked
nights per year is 101, many listings are not affected by this policy. This is the reason why
the effect of the night cap policy is small. Under the night cap policy, higher-income
long-term renters benefit more from the policy than other renters with lower income. For
instance, the welfare improvement for non-white renters earning 25K-50K is $375 while the
improvement for white renters within the same income group is $387. Figure 7 is the spatial
distribution of the change in welfare under the night cap policy. Intuitively, locations with
frequently occupied listings (e.g., south-west Manhattan) see greater improvement under
the policy.
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In the next step, I am going to explore different night caps (60 days, 180 days). A lower
night cap would have a broader impact on renters and landlords; therefore, the results could
be interesting.
2.8. Conclusion
In this chapter, I investigate how Airbnb affects rental supply and affordability. To achieve
this goal, I building an empirical structural model allowing that long-term renters make
their location choices by taking into account potential income from listing their apartments
on Airbnb. I also model landlord and long-term renter’s decisions to join Airbnb or not
by comparing all the alternative choices. Given the data on rent, Airbnb price, occupancy
status and share of long-term rental and Airbnb units, I estimate the parameters in the
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Figure 7: Welfare Change across Locations (Night Cap)
demand function as well as the cost function for moving and operation on Airbnb.
The estimates of the model suggest that white renters with higher income are less price
sensitive. This group of renters also demonstrate lower moving cost and lower Airbnb
operation cost. However, the average Airbnb operation cost is so high that the total number
of Airbnb listings is small compared to the number of rental units in NYC. Given the
estimates, I evaluate the impact of Airbnb on long-term renters. I also evaluate how policies
targeting to protect long-term renters actually affect them.
In the counterfactual, I first turn off the channel of listing on Airbnb. I discover that Airbnb
has a negative impact on almost all long-term renters. In particular, Airbnb has a greater
impact on those who are white or have a higher income. On average, Airbnb reduces the
long-term rental supply by 0.49% and renter’s welfare by $3,312. Second, I explore two
policies that are targeted to protect the benefit of renters. One policy is the multi-dwelling
law and the other one is night cap. After eliminating all the illegal listings on Airbnb,
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renters from previously Airbnb-populated and high rent areas benefit most from the multi-
dwelling law. As for the night cap policy, I discover that this policy is much less effective
than the multi-dwelling law in improving long-term renters’ welfare.
There are a few limitations in this paper that represent directions for future research. First,
I do not model the competition between Airbnb and hotels. Li & Srinivasan (2019) discuss
the impact of Airbnb on the hotel industry. The model in this paper can be extended to
include hotels or even other related industries. Second, observed heterogeneity instead of
unobserved heterogeneity is used in the model. Including unobserved individual hetero-
geneity could improve the fit because it helps to account for unobserved factors that affect
individual location decisions. Third, the short-term demand is modeled in a “reduced-form”
way, because this paper focuses more on the long-term renters. However, a micro-founded
short-term demand system could make the analysis more credible.
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CHAPTER 3 : COSTLY PRICE ADJUSTMENT AND AUTOMATED PRICING:
THE CASE OF AIRBNB
3.1. Introduction
In markets where sellers have fixed inventories and limited selling time, optimal prices
respond to both the remaining inventory and time (Gallego & Van Ryzin 1994). Empirical
studies (Williams 2020; Rust & Cho 2018) examining pricing problems in these environments
also support Gallego and van Ryzin’s theoretical prediction (1994). However, on many e-
commerce platforms where small sellers are facing a fixed inventory and limited selling
time problem, we commonly observe price rigidity, which seems to contradict Gallego and
Ryzins theory. Indeed, I find this to be the case in the data set I study from Airbnb.
Furthermore, the pattern is not limited to new sellers. I find that some sellers with 1-2
years of experience on Airbnb also demonstrate a reluctance to adjust prices. There are
some possible reasons for this. Most sellers on these platforms are not large firms and likely
have other jobs; thus, they might not have enough time or find it too costly to manage their
listings. The automated pricing, which uses machine learning algorithms to automatically
price products, is becoming a standard feature on some of these platforms. For instance,
Airbnb allows hosts to use “Smart Pricing”, which automatically updates prices every day
according to the market conditions. Turo, a peer-to-peer car rental platform, and Stubhub,
a ticket resale platform, allow sellers to use “Automatic Pricing”(Turo) or “Manage Price
for Me”(Stubhub) to manage price setting without manual interference. One key feature of
automated pricing is that it reduces a seller’s burden; the seller does not need to carry out
a price-optimization problem every day.
In this chapter, I investigate sellers’ pricing behavior on the leading peer-to-peer accommo-
dation platform Airbnb and examine the revenue and welfare effects of automated pricing.
I develop an empirical framework to address the following research questions: What are the
main factors that determine a seller’s pricing behavior? How does automated pricing affect
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the pricing behavior through these factors, and what are the revenue and welfare impacts
of automated pricing?
For hosts on Airbnb, determining the “right” price to charge is a complex task. It requires
that a host know not only how much the current renters value her listing, but also what
future demand will be and her availability of supply. Since each host only has limited time
to rent out her listing for a given check-in date, the more time the host has the more likely
she will rent out her listing. The host may need to lower her price tomorrow if she fails to
rent out her listing today unless the renter who will arrive tomorrow is willing to pay more
than the renter arrives today. Therefore, renter’s willingness to pay would be one of the
main driving forces for the pricing dynamics. In addition, a listing’s inventory structure
is also an important element in determining the pricing dynamics. If the inventory of a
listing is shrinking, the host might have an incentive to increase her price. However, smaller
inventory can also imply smaller demand, thus, lower prices. This is because rentals are
generally in the form of different combinations of consecutive days, and the realization of
one rental type may exclude a host from accepting other rental types.
While renter’s willingness to pay and listing’s inventory structure are two important factors
that affect the optimal price, an additional building block is needed to explain why many
hosts on Airbnb do not adjust their prices. In the literature, “price rigidity” has been
associated with the cost of price adjustments (Rotemberg 1982; Levy et al. 1997; Slade &
M. 1998; Aguirregabiria 1999; Bergen et al. 2003; Zbaracki et al. 2004; Kano 2006; Merlo
et al. 2015; Huang et al. 2019). This cost is due to the time and effort required to make price-
adjustment decisions. In general, a host needs to collect information about demand and her
competitors before she adjusts her price. This information collection process is sometimes
time-consuming. In addition, calculating and justifying the optimal price require additional
effort, which may further increase the host’s cost for adjusting her price. The cost of price
adjustment can also include laziness, ignorance or other unobserved factors that prevent
a host from changing her price. If the gain from the price adjustment exceeds the price
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adjustment cost, the host will adjust her price according to the evolution of the renter’s
willingness to pay and the inventory structure; otherwise, the price will stay the same.
Failing to respond to the change in renter’s willingness to pay or inventory structure may
result in revenue loss for the hosts. For instance, if a host’s inventory is booked up too
quickly, this may indicate that the host set her price too low. Therefore, the host should
have raised her price earlier in the selling period. The price adjustment cost blocks the
channels for price movement; thus, both the hosts and the platform may benefit from
reducing the cost of price adjustment. There are many ways to do this. For example, the
platform can provide tips and information to assist hosts to make their pricing decisions, or
the platform can help hosts adjust their prices directly – through automated pricing. This
paper specifically focuses on automated pricing. Ultimately, the automated pricing problem
is a dynamic pricing problem that reduces the price adjustment cost and allows the price
to respond to changes in the demand and inventory structure.
In order to study the pricing behavior of hosts on Airbnb and to evaluate the welfare impact
of automated pricing, I build a dynamic pricing model with price adjustment cost. I allow
heterogenous renters to arrive stochastically. I assume that they know when they want
to travel, and how long they want to stay and that they choose among all the available
listings without considering delaying their purchases. Given the expectation about how
renters value their listings, forward-looking hosts maximize their expected revenues taking
into account the cost of price adjustment. When hosts themselves have to bear the cost of
price adjustment, they are reluctant to adjust their prices unless the benefit of the price
adjustment exceeds the cost.
There are several challenges in the model setup and the estimation. First, each listing
can only provide one unit of rental for a given check-in date. Therefore, I need to impose
additional structure on the choice process to solve the listing assignment problem. Second,
the competition among hosts causes the dimension of the dynamic pricing problem to grow
exponentially with the number of listings. In order to reduce the dimension, I assume that
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each host only considers her own state and a set of system states, which summarize the
information of her competitors when making a pricing decision. Third, even with the system
state setting, the dimension of the choice variable and the number of unique listings still
make the dynamic pricing problem intractable. In this scenario, I employ several clustering
methods to shrink the dimension of the pricing problem.
Once the model is estimated, I focus on price adjustment cost as the first channel through
which automated pricing affects pricing behavior. With automated pricing, price adjust-
ment costs will be reduced; thus prices can be adjusted as frequently as necessary. In the
case of automated pricing, the necessary price adjustments then depend on the change in
renter’s willingness to pay and inventory structure. Since renters arrive randomly and they
have different stay length requirements, automated pricing will take into account the trade-
off between renting out a listing today versus tomorrow through these two channels. If
renters arriving tomorrow are less price-sensitive, automated pricing may need to increase
the prices tomorrow to capture the opportunity for higher rental revenue. Additionally, if
a host’s inventory becomes scattered and the host does not have many consecutive days
available, automated pricing will decrease the prices to help hosts attract more renters.
Even though each listing on Airbnb is unique, there is still competition among hosts; hence,
automated pricing will also consider the competition in the market. Although the impact of
automated pricing depends on the interaction among those factors, the competition among
hosts creates a significant computational burden. Since there are thousands of hosts in
the market, it is not feasible to solve the strategic interaction among them. To make the
problem tractable, I follow the ideas developed in Weintraub et al. (2008), Sweeting (2015)
and Buchholz (2015). I assume, in equilibrium, that each host’s decision only depends on
her own state, assuming that the rest of the market evolves deterministically along the path
implied by these strategies. Therefore, the multi-agent dynamic pricing problem is reduced
to a single-agent dynamic programming problem.
Since there is no theoretical result about the price adjustment cost reduction under the
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environment of varying renter’s willingness to pay, special inventory structure and competi-
tion, the actual impact of automated pricing on revenue and welfare is unclear. This paper
is the first one to use a structural dynamic pricing model to study the pricing behavior of
hosts on Airbnb. The structural model can inform what factors automated pricing should
consider. More importantly, this model also provides quantitative results about the revenue
and welfare impact of automated pricing.
The model is estimated using a novel data set of Airbnb pricing and rental history. The
data set includes all the accessible characteristics, including listing location, number of
bedrooms, reviews and amenities. The data set also includes detailed pricing information,
which enables me to model the intertemporal price dynamics for given check-in dates. The
demand function is formulated as the combination of the Poisson processes with different
rental types and the discrete choice model, which describes hosts’ preferences among listings.
Since some listing characteristics are not observable, they might contaminate the estimation
result. In order to alleviate this problem, I supplement the analysis with information such as
the characteristics of the building that the listing is in and the history of the host’s operation.
This information, together with other observed listing characteristics, acts as the proxy to
listing quality. Given the demand function, a host’s pricing decision is formulated as a
dynamic discrete choice problem. When solving the pricing problem, the host only considers
her own states and a system state that summarizes the information of her competitors.
Under this setting, the “curse of dimensionality” problem caused by the competition among
hosts is minimized. I also employ clustering methods to reduce the number of value functions
in the system.
The parameters of the model are estimated via maximum likelihood in two steps. In the
first step, I recover the parameters in the Poisson process and utility function. In the second
step, I recover the price adjustment cost. I find that the price adjustment cost decreases
over time and that it is between 0.9% and 2.2% of the average listed price. For instance,
if the average listed price is $195, the price adjustment cost is about $1.77 to $4.28. I
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also find that renters with longer stays tend to book early and they are more sensitive to
price changes when they are compared to those who plan for shorter stays. This finding
suggests that the hosts have an incentive to increase their prices to capture those with a
higher willingness to pay. However, because of the diminishing time to sell and the price
adjustment cost, the increasing trend is suppressed and prices are frictionally decreasing.
Given the parameter estimates, I evaluate the impact of automated pricing, thereby pro-
viding managerial insights. Automated pricing is formulated as a dynamic pricing process
without price adjustment. I find that the automated pricing increases Airbnb’s revenue by
4.8% and the hosts’ revenue by 3.9%. This result indicates that both the platform and the
hosts benefit from reducing the cost of price adjustment. From Airbnb’s perspective, this
would be a strong evidence for supporting automated pricing. I also find that, without the
price adjustment cost, the hosts tend to first increase their prices and then reduce them
as the check-in date draws near. Renters who arrive at the beginning or late during the
selling period benefit from automated pricing, since they face lower prices. However, those
who arrive in the middle of the selling period are worse off due to higher prices. Addi-
tionally, I compute a counterfactual of reducing the price adjustment cost to one half of its
original level and calculate the revenue and welfare impacts. This counterfactual is meant
to represent the case where Airbnb only provides pricing suggestions instead of automated
pricing. Finally, I allow the automated pricing to update a host’s price weekly rather than
daily during the selling period. In practice, a daily price update could be computational-
ly burdensome to the platform. Therefore the platform may have an incentive to consider
weekly automated pricing instead of daily. In this counterfactual, weekly automated pricing
increases Airbnb’s revenue by 4.1% and the hosts’ revenue by 3.4%. Although the revenue
improvement under weekly automated pricing is less than daily automated pricing, the
difference is small.
To my knowledge, this is the first empirical study that explores the pricing dynamic and
automated pricing in the context of Airbnb. This paper contributes to the literature in the
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following three aspects. First, I develop a novel application of dynamic pricing under price
adjustment cost using a high-frequency data set that allows the modeling of intertemporal
pricing behavior. Most of the existing literature on Airbnb (Zervas et al. 2017; Barron et al.
2018; Li & Srinivasan 2019) uses snapshot data that only allows researchers to observe
one price for each check-in date. This paper also provides empirical evidence to support
automated pricing, whose revenue effect is not clear to both the platform and researchers.
Second, in the hospitality industry, modeling different lengths of stay is increasingly ap-
pealing to both hotel managers and researchers. In this paper, I allow the modeling for
multi-day rentals, which are essential for understanding the pricing dynamics on Airbnb.
Lastly, I empirically solve the dynamic pricing problem with many sellers by using an equi-
librium concept similar to the oblivious equilibrium. This equilibrium concept significantly
reduces the computational burden.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the related literature.
In section 3.3, I use a simple dynamic pricing model to demonstrate what potential factors
affect the optimal price path. Section 3.4 introduces the data and provides some model-free
evidence regarding the pricing dynamics. Section 3.5 sets up the model. In Section 3.6
and 3.7, I describe the estimation method and results. The counterfactual experiment is
presented in Section 3.8 and Section 3.9 presents the conclusion.
3.2. Related Literature
The model used in this paper builds on the literature of dynamic pricing, which has been
widely studied in economics, marketing and operations research communities both theoret-
ically and empirically (Stokey 1979; Besanko & Winston 1990; Gallego & Van Ryzin 1994;
Talluri & van Ryzin 2004; Nair 2007; Hendel & Nevo 2013). More specifically, I focus on
the dynamic pricing in markets where sellers only have limited time to sell a limited amount
of inventory. Intertemporal price discrimination naturally arises in these markets because
of the restriction on selling time and quantity. Under different situations, the price can be
either decreasing or increasing (Su 2007). For example, if renter’s willingness to pay of the
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listing is constant or decreasing over time, a seller should decrease her price if there is less
time to sell for a given size of the inventory, or at a given point in time, the optimal price will
increase as the size of the inventory decreases (Pashigian 1988; Pashigian & Bowen 1991;
Gallego & Van Ryzin 1994; Bitran & Mondschein 1997; McAfee & te Velde 2008). If renter’s
willingness to pay is increasing or non-monotonic over time, there is no general prediction
about the direction of the optimal price. Sweeting (2012) adopts a simple dynamic pricing
model to capture the pricing behavior of event ticket sellers on a secondary event ticket
website. He concludes that a dynamic pricing model can fit the data well and explain why
there is a drop in price as the event date approaches. Under the assumption that the contin-
uation value does not depend on the current price, Sweeting’s model naturally generates the
non-increasing pattern of the price path. Lazarev (2013) estimates a dynamic pricing model
using airline data and analyzes the welfare effect of airline pricing. Neither Lazarev (2013)
nor Lazarev (2013) allows for a stochastic arrival of consumers; therefore, their analyses
mainly center around the intertemporal price discrimination. Williams (2020), however,
puts stochastic arrival and intertemporal price discrimination under the same framework
and successfully disentangles the effects of these two forces. In his model, business travelers,
who tend to arrive late, are more likely to be willing to pay higher prices. In order to max-
imize profit, airline companies have the incentive to reserve seats for late arrival customers.
Williams demonstrates that intertemporal price discrimination is then complementary to
the price change according to stochastic demand. In this chapter, both stochastic demand
and intertemporal price discrimination exist but in a more complicated manner due to the
extremely limited capacity and the different length of stays. Additionally, I allow prices to
depend on inventory structure. The mixed effect of these elements may generate a non-
monotonic price path. Therefore, this study supplements the literature by providing extra
empirical evidence that there is no general prediction about the price under the dynamic
pricing framework.
This chapter also relies on the literature about the cost of price adjustment. Many empiri-
cal studies have shown that both managerial costs and physical costs for price adjustment
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are significant in retailing and other industries (Rotemberg 1982; Levy et al. 1997; Slade &
M. 1998; Aguirregabiria 1999; Bergen et al. 2003; Zbaracki et al. 2004; Kano 2006). More
recent empirical papers by Merlo et al. (2015) and Huang et al. (2019) incorporate price
adjustment cost into the dynamic pricing setting to explain the price stickiness observed
in the data. Little is known, however, about the impact of removing the price adjustment
cost in a competitive environment. A theory paper by Dana Jr et al. (2018) mentions that
competition in the market can prevent sellers from using intertemporal price discrimination
when less elastic buyers arrive late in the selling period. Empirically, it can be prohibitive
to calculate the equilibrium of a dynamic pricing model with competition because of the
exponentially growing state space. Taking advantage of a large number of players, the obliv-
ious equilibrium (Weintraub et al. 2008) and similar equilibrium concepts used in Buchholz
(2015) and Sweeting (2015) simplify the calculation by assuming that each individual’s
decision only depends on her own state and a system state but not the behavior of each
competitor in the market. By using a similar equilibrium concept, this chapter extends
the dynamic pricing under the competitive environment to accommodate price adjustment
costs.
Other relevant papers include literature on empirical analysis of Airbnb. Airbnb, which
was founded in 2008, is growing extremely quickly; however, there are only a few empirical
papers on this topic. Zervas et al. (2017) is the first paper that focuses on Airbnb and
hotel interaction. Using hedonic regression analysis, Zervas et al. (2017) examines the
impact of Airbnb on hotel revenue in Austin, TX and concludes that the existence of
Airbnb reduces hotel revenue by 8%-10%. Li & Srinivasan (2019) studies hotels’ strategic
responses to Airbnb. They discover that Airbnb’s presence help recover the lost underlying
demand due to seasonal hotel pricing; therefore, some hotel may benefit from less seasonal
or even counter-seasonal pricing. Farronato & Fradkin (2018) examines the welfare impact
of Airbnb on travelers, hosts and hotels. Combining a data set that includes listings from
the entire United States with data from Zillow on housing and rental prices, Barron et al.
(2018) finds that a 1% increase in Airbnb listing leads to a 0.018% increase in rents and
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a 0.026% increase in house prices. This chapter investigates Airbnb through the lens of
pricing dynamics and provides insights into the automated pricing feature.
3.3. Illustrative Examples
In this section, I provide three examples to illustrate how optimal price patterns change
in response to renter’s willingness to pay, inventory structure and price adjustment cost.
These examples frame the pricing problem of hosts and show what factors automated pricing
should consider.
Suppose there is one seller who owns one unit of a product. The product is perishable; if
it is not sold by time t = 0, the value of the product becomes zero. The seller starts selling
at time t = T and can set a different price in each period. The objective of the seller is to




Vt is the expected profit for selling the product. With probability Dt(pt), the item will
be sold at price pt. With probability 1 − Dt(pt), no one purchase the item and the seller
enters into next period when she can set new price for the product. Dt(pt) is changing over
time and buyer’s willingness to pay of the product might also be time-varying. Vt+1 is the
continuation value which describes the opportunity cost if the item is sold at period t. The










where the right-hand side of the first order condition Equation (3.1) is the Lerner index
which is the inverse of price elasticity. Vt+1 is the opportunity cost for selling the product
at period t. It is easy to prove that the opportunity cost is decreasing in time t if Dt(pt)
is decreasing in pt (Sweeting (2012)). While the opportunity cost is decreasing, the price
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Table 16: Parameter Setting of the Examples
µt αt
Case 1 0 0.02T t+ 0.06
Case 2 0 0.06T t+ 0.02
Case 3 0 0.07T t+ 0.01
elasticity could move in any direction.
Varying Buyer’s Willingness to Pay
I assume that there is only one buyer in each period and her willingness to pay of the product
is vt. If vt is greater than the price of the product pt, she will purchase the product. I assume




Therefore, the probability for the buyer to purchase the product is
Pr(vt > pt) = Dt(pt) =
exp(ct − αtpt)
1 + exp(ct − αtpt)
where ct = µtαt. I consider 3 cases with 3 different set of parameters that are summarized
in Table 16: In each of these 3 cases, the seller has T = 25 periods to sell and αt decreases
linearly from t = T to t = 0, so that the buyer’s willingness to pay is higher toward the end
of the selling period. When the buyer’s willingness to pay is increasing fast enough, the seller
has an incentive to increase her price over time. Otherwise, the decreasing opportunity for
sale dominates, and the seller will reduce her price to encourage the transaction. In Case
1, the price sensitivity parameter αt decreases from 0.08 when t = T to 0.06 when t = 0.
The optimal price decreases even though the buyer’s willingness to pay increases. In Case 2
(αt decreases from 0.08 to 0.02), the optimal price is increasing at the beginning and then
decreasing. The increasing trend of buy’s willingness to play dominates the decreasing trend
of opportunity cost in the first 15 period. After that, the opportunity cost has the upper
hand and pulls down the price. In Case 3 (αt decreases from 0.08 to 0.01), the optimal price
is increasing because the demand elasticity is dropping fast enough to compensate for the
decreasing opportunity for sale. In this example, the optimal price paths can be increasing,
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Figure 8: Optimal Price Paths under Different Price Sensitivity
decreasing or non-monotonic (Figure 8). This indicates that renter’s willingness to pay is
crucial in determining the price pattern.
Inventory Structure
Next, I extend the above simple dynamic pricing model to accommodate the inventory
structure. Instead of selling one product, the seller has 3 products a, b and c in this
example. There is only 1 unit of each product. I also assume that the buyer can purchase
one product or multiple products. If the buyer purchases multiple products, they must
be in the form of (a,b), (b,c) or (a,b,c). This is similar to room booking on Airbnb – a
renter books a single day or consecutive days. Since the seller only has one unit of each
product, the size of the inventory may not provide sufficient information for pricing. Which
product(s) is(are) left would be more informative. Figure 9 demonstrates the optimal price
path under different inventory1. (1, 1, 1) indicates that product a, b and c are all available,
and (0, 1, 1) indicates that only product b and c are available. The optimal price is not
monotonic in the size of the inventory. For example, (1, 0, 1) excludes buyers who want
1The detail of the setting is in the Appendix
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Figure 9: Optimal Price Paths across Different Inventory
to buy (a, b) or (b, c) and potentially faces a smaller market than (1, 1, 0), therefore
the seller has an incentive to cut the price. This result is essential in understanding the
price dynamics on Airbnb. In many industries where there is no structure restriction on
inventory, price is generally a non-increasing function in the size of inventory. However, a
host on Airbnb may need to reduce her price when “orphan days” – a short period between
bookings – appear, because her listing is less likely to be rented on those isolated days.
Price Adjustment Cost
In this last example, I assume that price adjustment is costly.
Vt = max
pt
ptDt(pt) + (1−Dt(pt))Vt−1 −mt ∗ 1(pt 6= pt+1)
where mt is the price adjustment cost. Using the parameter setting in Case 2 in the first
example, I calculate the optimal price path under different mt (Figure 10). The price
adjustment cost causes the price to under-react to the change in the demand. When the
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Figure 10: Optimal Price Paths under Different Price Adjustment Cost
price adjustment can generate greater revenue improvement than its cost, the seller will
then adjust the price. If the price adjustment cost is high enough, the optimal price does
not respond to the change in the renter’s willingness to pay or the inventory structure.
The existence of the price adjustment cost becomes an obstacle for efficient pricing. There-
fore, reducing this cost and restoring the pricing mechanism, which reflects the change in
the market, are the essential task for automated pricing. The examples described in this
section abstract away from many other factors such as competition and renter heterogeneity,
and hence I develop a more realistic model in Section 5. The factors discussed here remain
the key drivers of the price dynamics on Airbnb.
3.4. Data and Descriptive Analysis
3.4.1. The Platform: Airbnb
Airbnb, an online platform established in 2008, allows people to list or rent short-term
lodging in residential properties. Airbnb now operates in more than 190 countries and has
more than 3 million listings; one-third of these listings are comparable to hotel rooms (entire
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Figure 11: Number of Comparable Rooms
apartment with less than one bedroom, Figure 11). Airbnb is the dominant player in the
peer-to-peer apartment rental market and it is growing rapidly. Airbnb’s market share of
room nights sold in the U.S. lodging market grew from less than 1% in 2014 to more than
8% in 20172.
If a renter wants to rent an apartment on Airbnb, she can search properties in a certain
area using a specific search filter such as listing type and number of bedrooms (Figure
12 is an example of a search result). If a property has the “instant booking” sign, the
renter can rent this apartment instantly without communicating with the host or waiting
for permission; otherwise, the transaction will not be finalized before the host confirms.
After the transaction, the renter can cancel or alter the rental with or without penalty
depending on the host’s cancellation policy. The host, on the other hand, can also cancel
the rental. If the cancellation is initiated by the host, Airbnb will impose a $50 fine on
the host and post a message in the review system stating that the host canceled the rental.
After the stay, the renter can leave a review for this listing.
The hosts have complete control over the rental prices, descriptions, cancellation rules and
availability of their apartments. Airbnb allows hosts to set prices 12 months in advance.
Hosts can also decide whether to add a cleaning fee to the rental price. In principle, a
2http://www.hotelappraisers.com/airbnbs-market-share-of-u-s-lodging-demand/
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Figure 12: An Example of Search Result
host can have more than one listing on Airbnb. While a multiple-listing owner might be a
concern in the analysis, it is believed that none of these multiple-listing owners has dominant
power in the market. Airbnb has also restricted the operation of this type of owner after
May 2015, though it is possible that a host uses different family members’ names to operate
multiple properties. Since it is impossible to discern these multiple-listing owners in the
data, I assume that each listing is owned by a separate owner. Airbnb collects commission
fees from both hosts and renters. The commission fee from the host is fixed at 3% of the
transaction (excluding tax but including cleaning fee) and the service fee collected from
renters ranges between 6% - 12%3. In New York City, for instance, this service fee is always
around 12%.
Beginning in November 2015, Airbnb launched an automated pricing algorithm called “S-
mart Pricing”. If a listing owner chooses to use this algorithm, Airbnb adjusts the price
automatically. For instance, Airbnb may increase the host’s price if other similar listings
are renting out rapidly, or it may reduce the price if demand is low. With “Smart Pricing”,
3https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/1857/what-are-airbnb-service-fees
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listing owners no longer bear the burden of monitoring their prices. Changing prices be-
comes a more frequent behavior. Motivated by this new feature, I build a dynamic pricing
model to investigate the factors that automated pricing should consider and the welfare
implication of the automated pricing.
3.4.2. Observed Variables
The main data set is collected from Airbnb’s website. For each listing in the sample,
I observe listing type (shared room, private room or entire apartment), number of bed-
room/bathroom, amenities (such as air conditioning, wi-fi, TV, washer), location, cancella-
tion policy, minimum stay requirement, number of photos, rating, number of reviews, length
of reviews, whether the listing can be booked instantly, whether the owner is a superhost4,
cleaning fee, price sequence of each check-in date, when the listing was booked, transaction
price and a unique listing ID.
The main data set does not include any individual information about the renters except
for the time when they booked the listings, their check-in dates and the length of their
stays. This data limitation reduces the room for renter heterogeneity. However, the length
of stay can still play an important role in capturing the heterogeneity: renters with different
lengths of stay may arrive very differently across time and have a different level of price
sensitivity.
In addition to the information mentioned above, I further observe when each listing was
created. This variable is constructed by combing the main data set with the information
provided by Inside Airbnb5 through unique ID matching. This variable provides a measure
of how experienced the host is. Moreover, I augment my data with the age and the value
of the property at the building level from Infogroup. To construct these two variables,
I use the location information to match the Infogroup data to the main data set6. This
4The superhost rating is an indicator for a good reputation. To be qualified as superhost, a host has to
meet serval criteria. https://www.airbnb.com/superhost
5http://insideairbnb.com/. This website provides historical Airbnb listing information in many cities
around the world
6There could be multiple apartments in one building. In this case, the property age and value are the
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additional information helps control for the individual-specific characteristics. However, the
matching between Airbnb data and the Infogroup data is not straightforward. Airbnb does
not provide the exact location of a listing. In general, the distance between the true location
and the data location ranges from 0-400 feet. I assign each listing to the nearest residential
building and use this to match the Infogroup data set.
3.4.3. The Sample
In order to understand the pricing behavior and evaluate the impact of automated pricing,
it is necessary to have pricing data that track the same listing and the same check-in date
across time. The price calendar for Oct 4, 2015 to Oct 31, 2015 for each host on Manhattan
in New York City was scanned on a daily basis starting from Aug 2, 2015. For each host in
this sample, I observe at least two months (56 days) of price movement for each check-in
date between Oct 4, 2015 and Oct 31, 2015. In principle, Airbnb allows hosts to set price 12
months in advance. Since 89% of the rentals were booked within two months of the check-in
date, the length of the price sequence considered in this paper is sufficient for capturing
the major price dynamic. More importantly, Airbnb launched “Smart Pricing” at the end
of Nov 2015, which was later than the sample period. Therefore, this sample allows me to
examine the implications for automated pricing during a time when hosts were not exposed
to this pricing tool. It is possible that some hosts used other third-party automated pricing
services in my sample, but this number would be very small. This is also confirmed by the
pricing team at Airbnb.
To deliver the final sample for analysis, I restrict my investigations to listings that are
provided as “entire apartments”. The reason for this restriction is twofold. First, listing
type is the most used filter on Airbnb when renters are searching for listings. Therefore,
listings with different types may not be considered at the same time by renters. Second,
hosts with “shared room” or “private room” type are more likely to block their listings
(remove their listings from the market). This behavior might add extra complication to the
same across these apartments
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Figure 13: Listing Distribution in NYC (Manhattan)
model. Among listings in the “entire apartment” category, I keep those with two or fewer
bedrooms that have two or fewer minimum nights requirement and a price range between
$50 and $350. As a result of applying these criteria, the total number of listings used in the
analysis is 5,434. Figure 13 shows the geographic distribution of these 5,434 listings. The
number of listings has substantial variation across different neighborhoods.
Table 17 provides price statistics on the distribution of prices across listings and days. The
average price for a listing, regardless of rental status, is $195 per night. This number is
about one half of the average hotel price of $315 in the same area. The average transactional
price, which is conditional on being rented, is $193 per night. Meanwhile, for those listings
which were not rented, the average price is $201 per night. While it indicates that listings
with lower prices are more likely to be rented, this result could be misleading without
controlling for the characteristics of the listings. In addition, the rate per night for the
weekend is higher than the weekday. This can be explained by the fact that during the
sample period, Airbnb primarily targeted leisure travelers rather than business travelers
who are less price-sensitive and would mostly stay on weekdays.
While the pricing information can be accurately collected from the website, obtaining ac-
curate supply and demand is challenging for three reasons. First, listing owners or Airbnb
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Table 17: Price Statistics
Mean SD Median Min Max Obs.
All 195.3 125.6 192 50 350 162,834
Rented 192.6 121.3 189 50 350 52,106
Not Rented 201.2 151.2 195 50 350 110,728
Weekend 205.3 156.7 201 55 350 45,592
Weekday 190.5 144.3 188 50 350 117,242
An observation is the combination of a listing and a check-in date. “All”: price
regardless of rental status. “Rented”: transaction price. “Not Rented”: lowest
price for the check-in date. “Weekend and Weekday”: weekend price and weekday
price regardless of rental status
can block some check-in dates7. Second, a host can reject a renter’s request even though
the apartment is available. Lastly, renters can cancel their reservation before check-in. The
accuracy of the data, however, is not affected by the first concern because the data allow
me to distinguish whether a check-in date is blocked or booked. Before Nov 2015, blocked
dates and booked dates were coded differently; after that, however, it is not possible to dis-
tinguish between blocked rooms and booked rooms8. Since the time period in the sample
is Oct 2015, this change has no impact on the analysis. Moreover, I do not model rejection
in this paper because the communication between host and renter is not accessible. In
the data collection process, the cancellation data on either the hosts or the renters are not
accessible. However, Table 18 shows that about 73% of the hosts implemented strict cancel-
lation policies. A strict cancellation policy means once a renter has paid for the rental, any
modification or cancellation will result in a 50% fine. Although ignoring cancellation might
bias the estimation, the effect is believed to be small due to the high cost of cancellation.
3.4.4. Price Rigidity and Rental Patterns
While the summaries in the previous section were essentially cross-sectional, this subsection
presents the main price and rental patterns. These patterns are crucial for building the
model for evaluating automated pricing. In particular, the low price change frequency
7If a host cancels a rental or violate the platform’s rules, Airbnb can block the host too
8Some researchers or data collection companies use machine learning techniques and review information
to infer the booking status. According to Fradkin et al. (2018), around 70% of the renters actually leave
reviews, which partly confirm whether a check-in date is booked or blocked.
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Table 18: Cancellation Policy
Flexible Moderate Strict
Freq. 815 653 3,966
Percent 15.00% 12.02% 72.98%
“Flexible”: full refund if cancelled at least one day be-
fore check-in date. “Moderate”: full refund if cancelled
at least 5 days before check-in date. “Strict”: 50% re-
fund if cancelled at least 7 days before check-in date
otherwise no refund
strongly suggests that automated pricing may have a substantial impact on a host’s pricing
behavior and revenue by reducing the price adjustment cost.
In Figure 14, I provide the distribution of price adjustments. In 38% of the listing-check-
in-date pairs, there is no price adjustment. No price adjustment means that a host keeps
her price constant throughout the selling period. Among all the listing-check-in-date pairs
where the number of price adjustment is zero, 74% (0.28/0.38) of them are not rented.
This ratio is decreasing in the number of price adjustments, which indicates that more price
adjustment is positively related to higher rental probability. Moreover, one can observe
that over 80% of the listing-check-in-date pairs have 2 or fewer price adjustments during
the selling period.
The above observation indicates that hosts are reluctant to adjust their prices. When price
adjustments happen, most of them are price reductions. Table 19 reveals that the majority
of price adjustments are price drops. For instance, more than 47% of the observations
(listing-check-in-date pair) show price reduction over the 8-week long period and only 14%
actually raise their prices. Conditional on being rented, the average and median price drop
are -$48 and -$35 respectively, and the average and median price change are -$23 and $-5.
Conditional on listings that are not rented, the average overall price change is -$15 and the
average price drop is -$40. Similar to the results shown in Table 17, rented listings tend to
have greater price cuts than listings that are not rented. Furthermore, Figure 14 and Table
19 together provide a more integrated picture of hosts’ pricing behavior – some hosts do not
adjust their prices frequently and the overall trend of price is decreasing. This observation
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Figure 14: Price Adjustment Frequency
is also confirmed by Figure 15, which shows the average listing price over the 56-day selling
period. The relatively flat part at the beginning indicates that hosts do not adjust their
prices frequently. However, the average price is gradually decreasing from $210 to $190
In order to obtain a more accurate price adjustment pattern, I regress the log-price on a
set of characteristics, location dummies and time dummies.
log(Pt,k) = Dtβ1 +Xkβ2 + Zt,kβ3 + Cmβ4 + εt,k (3.2)
where Pt,k is the listed price for listing k, t days before the check-in date m. Cm is the check-
in date dummy. Dt denotes the time dummy that measures the days prior to the check-in
date. Xk is the characteristics of listing k, including room type, number of bedrooms,
amenities, cleaning fee, deposit, number of photos, cancelation policy, reviews and location.
Zt,k are the variables that measure the number of competitors and the average price of those
competitors.
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Table 19: Price Adjustment Direction & Magnitude
Mean SD 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th % to Group
All
Increase $19.2 43.5 $5 $9 $15 $35 $50 14.23%
Decrease $-45.1 122.1 $-54 $-45 $-25 $-20 $-5 47.56%
Entire Group $-20.1 98.2 $-50 $-25 $0 $0 $5 100%
Booked
Increase $16.2 35.9 $5 $10 $15 $25 $30 17.13%
Decrease $-48.3 111.3 $-65 $-60 $-35 $-25 $-15 52.13%
Entire Group $-23.5 85.1 $-60 $-35 $-5 $0 $5 100%
Not Booked
Increase $20.1 65.7 $5 $10 $15 $35 $55 15.17%
Decrease $-40.1 133.5 $-65 $-60 $-30 $-15 $-5 45.41%
Entire Group $-15.2 112.2 $-60 $-20 $0 $0 $5 100%
An observation is the combination of a listing and a check-in date. “All”: all observations
regardless of rental status. “Booked”: observations that are rented. “Not Booked”: observations
that are not rented. “Increase”: the transaction price or the “last minute” price is higher than
the initial price. “Decrease”: the transaction price or the “last minute” price is lower than the
initial price
Figure 15: Average Price
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Table 20 shows the results from utilizing all observations regardless of whether the listings
are rented or not. The coefficients in Column (1) are estimated without adding a check-in
date fixed effect. The price falls about 9% from 8 weeks away to the check-in date and the
price drop speed becomes more rapid when it approaches the check-in date. Column (2) is
the result of a check-in date fixed effect. The price also drops about 9% from 8 weeks away
to the check-in date, and the increasing speed pattern is preserved. This result indicates
that the price trend during the selling period does not vary much across different check-in
dates. One difference between the result in Table 20 and Figure 15 is that in Figure 15 the
average price drops about 13% from the beginning of the selling period to the end; however,
the price decrease shown in Table 20 is about 9%. Since Zt,k, the number of competitors
and the average price of those competitors, are the only time-varying variables other than
the time dummies, the competition among hosts contributes to the price dynamics and is an
important element in determining the listing price. Lastly, in order to investigate the price
variation across different price levels, 5 quantiles (10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 90%) regressions
are run. Most of the price decreases happen at the lower 25th percentile, which means
listings with lower prices tend to have more price adjustment than those with higher prices.
From the regression analysis, one can see the overall price pattern. However, this is not
enough to inform the dynamic pricing modeling. As it is mentioned in the previous section,
renters with different length of stay requirements may have very different price preferences.
In addition, the size and structure of the inventory are also crucial in the pricing procedure.
The key ingredient to connect inventory structure and pricing decision is the modeling
of multi-day rental. If each check-in date is treated separately, like it is in most of the
prior literature, the estimated demand will not accurately capture renters’ true preferences.
Figure 16 shows the number of rentals with different length of stay for the check-in dates
between Oct 4, 2015 and Oct 10, 2015. The total number of rentals, regardless of rental
length, was around 4400. Multi-day rentals (≥ 2 days) account for 74% of the total rentals.







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 16: Number of Rentals
Note: Y axis is the number of rentals. The number on top of each bar represents the fraction of
each rental type
Moreover, there is substantial variation in the length of stay across the selling period. Figure
17 shows that renters who preferred longer stay would book early while renters preferred
shorter stays would book late. The composition of rentals with different length varied
substantially across the selling period. For instance, more than 50% of the rentals last from
5 to 7 days when it was two months before the check-in date. However, when the bookings
were made one or two weeks before the check-in date, the majority of the rental types were
1 and 2 days. These rental patterns strongly suggest that renters with different stay lengths
might have different preferences; therefore, the model used to evaluate automated pricing
should take these patterns into account as well.
75
Figure 17: Rentals across Time
Note: Y axis is the number of rentals.
3.5. An Empirical Model of Rental Choice and Price Setting
In the previous section, I showed that some hosts do not adjust their prices frequently and
that the overall trend of price is decreasing. Moreover, the rental patterns indicate that
there is substantial variation in the length of rentals across the selling period. In order to
capture these features, I build a dynamic pricing model with price adjustment cost. There
are several challenges in the model setup. First, each listing can only provide one unit
of rental for a given check-in date. Therefore, I need to impose more structure on the
choice process to solve the listing assignment problem. Second, the competition among
hosts causes the dimension of the dynamic pricing problem to grow exponentially with the
number of listings in the market. In order to reduce the dimension, I assume that each host
only considers her own state and a set of system states, which summarize the information
of her competitors when making a pricing decision.
This empirical model allows the identification of the demand with different rental types
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and the price adjustment cost. Moreover, the model considers factors and their interactions
with the price adjustment cost. In particular, those factors are renter’s varying willingness
to pay and inventory structure; these are the key ingredients in evaluating automated
pricing because automated pricing releases the price from the restriction imposed by the
cost. Before presenting the model, I first introduce several notations that are related to the
timing and the rental structure.
3.5.1. Setup
I define a check-in week as a calendar week beginning on Sunday and ending on Saturday.
In Figure 18, there are four check-in weeks: week 1 to week 4. For a given check-in week,
renters can book a listing up to T days before this check-in week. T is defined as the days
before the Sunday of the check-in week. For example, in Figure 18, time t is 11 days before
check-in week 1 and 18 days before check-in week 2. In general, a rental can be within one
check-in week or overlap different check-in weeks. In this model, I assume that if a rental
spans over multiple check-in weeks, this rental will be split into multiple rentals and each
rental is within a check-in week. This assumption maintains the multi-day rental structure
while significantly reducing the computational burden. Moreover, renters are categorized
by rental type, which is defined by the check-in day and the length of stay. For instance,
type 1 renters are those who want to stay on Sunday; type 2 renters are those who want
to stay on Monday and type 8 renters are those who want to stay on Sunday and Monday
(the detail of the rental types is in the Appendix).
3.5.2. Listing Choice
The model of listing choice characterizes how a renter chooses a listing and how a listing is
eventually rented. I assume that a renter’s travel date and length of stay are exogenously
determined. Because of each host’s limited inventory, the rental type can describe how the
mix of different renter’s willingness to pay varies across the selling period.
Renter’s arrival and listing choice t days before a given check-in week, renters with
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Figure 18: Price Calendar
rental type j randomly arrive according a Poisson distribution with parameter λjt . A type j
renter selects her preferred listing among all the available listings by solving a static discrete
choice problem. The indirect utility for a type j renter to choose listing k at time t is
vjt,k = Xkβ − α
jP jt,k + ε
j
t,k (3.3)
where Xk includes the observed characteristics of listing k such as amenities, location,
rating and photo. P jt,k is the effective nightly rate of type j rental of listing k at time t. The
effective nightly rate P jt,k is defined as the average nightly rate including the cleaning fee and
the service fee paid to Airbnb. εjt,k is the unobserved idiosyncratic utility shock that follows
and iid type 1 extreme value distribution. If the renter leaves the market without purchase,




t,k > maxr 6=k{v
j
t,r}) define as the probability
that a renter intends to choose listing k, therefore with the logit error assumption
Gjt,k =
exp(vjt,k)







where N jt is the number of all the available listings which can accept type j rental. For
instance, if j is a Mon-Wed rental type, a listing with Monday sold is not in N jt .
Allocation Mechanism If multiple renters, with the same rental type, prefer the same
listing, each of them receives the listing with equal probability. Let Qjt,k(M
j
t ) be the proba-








Hosts do not know the actual number of renters that seek to book but only the distribution,




t ) without conditional on





















It is also possible that renters with different types prefer the same listing. I assume that a
host can only process one rental at a time at most. Let g̃jt be the probability that determines
how likely type j rental will be processed by a host
g̃jt =
1(j is available)∑n
k=1 1(k is available)
(3.7)
where n is the number of all possible rental types. The indicator function in Equation (3.7)
guarantees that if type j rental is not available it is excluded from this probability. g̃jt serves
two purposes in the model. First, since hosts rarely process more then one rental at a time,
this setting is a parsimonious way to determine the rental type that is actually processed
by a host. Each possible rental type will be considered by a host with equal probability.
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Second, with g̃jt I can write down an analytical form of the demand function. Combining











the non-rental probability. Djt,k not only characterizes the rental probability, it is also the
transition probability describes how the inventory evolve over time.
3.5.3. Price Setting by Hosts
The rental probability Djt,k depends on time, rental type, price, listing characteristics,
renter’s preference and inventory structure. Given the information of Djt,k, forward-looking
hosts maximize the expected revenues of each check-in week in the selling period series. In
each of the sequential selling periods, a host can either choose to set a new price or leave the
price unchanged from the previous period. However, if the host chooses to adjust her price,
she incurs a price adjustment cost. I assume that prices take on discrete value. Moreover,
there exist price specific idiosyncratic shocks, which are only observable to the hosts. The






where n is the number of all possible rental types within a week, Djt is the type j rental
probability defined in Equation (3.8) and rjt is the revenue associated with type j rental,
with the cleaning fee subtracted. While the cost of renting out an apartment could include
cleaning, utilities, maintenance and other related costs, cleaning is the most direct and
primary cost associated with each rental. Considering the relatively short length of each
stay, I believe that other costs for operating Airbnb listing are in the form of fixed costs.
If I assume that the cleaning fee collected by the host is the actual cleaning cost, rjt is the
profit for a type j rental. Therefore, for a given check-in week, the optimal price setting is
summarized by the following Bellman equation
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+ Est−1,ut−1|st,ut,PtVt−1(st−1, ut−1)−mt · 1(Pt 6= Pt+1) + ut(Pt)
}
(3.9)
In Equation (3.9), st are the observed state variables. ut is the price specific idiosyncratic
shock which is assumed to be i.i.d with type 1 extreme value distribution and scale parameter
σ. mt is the price adjustment cost and Est−1,ut−1|st,ut,PtVt−1(st−1, ut−1) is the expected
continuation value after type j rental is realized and the expectation is over (st−1, ut−1)
conditional on (st, ut, Pt).
State Variables
Since the number of listings is large, one host’s behavior would have little impact on others.
Similar to the idea of oblivious equilibrium developed by Weintraub et al. (2008), I assume
that each host’s decision is based on her own state and a set of system states which evolve
deterministically. In Equation (3.4), the probability for choosing listing k is
Gjt,k =
exp(vjt,k)









t,r)). In my application, N
j
t is a large




1 + exp(vjt,k) + exp(ss
j
t )
where ssjt is defined as the system state of type j rental. Hosts only consider their own states
and the system states sst = {ssjt}nj=1 which summarize the number of the competitors and
their price choices. The advantage of this simplification is that while the model becomes
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tractable, competition is not entirely ignored.
With this simplification, a host’s state variables (st, ut) can be decomposed into (Pt+1, at+1, sst, ut).
Pt+1 is the host’s own price at time t+ 1; and it affects the host’s pricing decision through
the price adjustment cost. For instance, a host will change her price only when the revenue
improvement (over not adjusting the price) exceeds the price adjustment cost. at+1 is the
inventory of a listing. It describes availability status of each day within a check-in week. If a
listing can only be booked for Sunday, at+1 can be represented by a vector (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
meaning that Sunday is available (1) but all the other days are not (0). Once at+1 becomes
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), the value function Vt(st, ut) is equal to zero. In addition, when t reaches
zero V0 = 0 – unsold inventory after the check-in date represents no revenue opportunity.
State Transition
Let νt(st−1, ut−1 | st, ut, Pt) be the transition probability that describes a host’s belief about
how the states evolve over time. I assume that conditional independence is satisfied (Rust
1987), meaning that νt(st−1, ut−1 | st, ut, Pt) = ω(ut−1)gt(st−1 | st, Pt). ω is the density
function of the idiosyncratic shock ut−1 and gt is the transition probability of the observed
states st−1 given st and Pt. This probability can be further decomposed as
gt(st−1 | st, Pt) = g1t(sst−1 | at, st, Pt)g2t(at | st, Pt)g3t(Pt | st, Pt)
= g1t(sst−1 | sst)g2t(at | st, Pt) (3.10)
The second equality in Equation (3.10) is due to the fact that the system states are not
affected by individual’s behavior and Pt is deterministic given Pt. Since the system states
evolve deterministically, the path of sst is perceived by all the hosts. Introducing stochastic
system states makes the model computationally intensive, and hence I opt to maintain a
simple structure. Given this transition structure, g2t(at | st, Pt) is then determined by the
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rental probabilities {Djt}nj=1. Equation (3.9) can be written as:







rjt (Pt, st) + Eut−1Vt−1(st−1, ut−1)
]
−mt · 1(Pt 6= Pt+1) + ut(Pt)
(3.11)
3.5.4. Equilibrium
A host’s pricing decision depends on her own states, a set of system states and beliefs about
how the states will change in the future. The host’s own states include her inventory status
and the price she set in last period. The system states summarize all relevant information
about the competition. I can define an equilibrium under this structure as follows:
Definition. The equilibrium consists of the demand probabilities {Dt,k}, the pricing func-
tions {Pt,k}, the initial availability vectors {aT+1,k} and a perceived path of system state
{ŝst} such that
1) Given the current period availability vector {at+1,k}, last period price {Pt−1,k} and the
perceived system state {ŝst}, each listing owner k chooses her price according to the pricing
function {Pt,k} which solve Equation (3.11)
2) In each period t, listings are rented according to the demand probability {Dt,k}. {Dt,k}
also determine the next period availability vector {at,k}.
3) {at+1,k} determine the number of players in each rental type j and {Pt,k} determine the
pricing decision. The aggregate movement of {at+1,k} and {Pt,k} imply the actual system
state {sst}: ssjt = log(
∑Njt exp(vjt,r)) which should be consistent with the perceived {ŝst}
Existence of this equilibrium is a direct consequence of the finite horizon and finite action-
space (Maskin & Tirole (2001)). The equilibrium determines the evolution of the system
state such that each host’s pricing decision is compatible with the system state. This equi-
librium concept permits the calculation of the optimal price under different counterfactual
scenarios.
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3.6. Identification and Estimation
3.6.1. Identification
The parameter set can de decomposed into demand parameters θ1 = {β, {αjt}, {λ
j
t}} and
supply parameters θ2 = {{mt}, σ}. In order to take full advantage of the data variation
and reduce the number of parameters, I impose additional restrictions on the parameters.
Given rental type j, each of {{αjt}, {λ
j
t}, {mt}} can only take four values depending on the
number of days before the check-in date. For example:
mt =

m1 less than 7 days before check-in
m2 7 to 21 days before check-in
m3 21 to 35 days before check-in
m4 more than 35 days before check-in
(3.12)
Given time t, each of {{αjt}, {λ
j
t}} can takes 7 values which are based on the length of stay
(within a week, there can be 7 different length of stay).
The key challenge for identification is separately identifying the demand parameters from
the arrival process parameters λjt . Without search data to pin down the arrival process,
an increase in arrivals could instead be seen as a change in the demand (Talluri & van
Ryzin 2004; Williams 2020). For instance, a listing was rented could be the result of a large
number of arrivals with low willingness to pay or a small number of arrivals with a high
willingness to pay. However, I argue that with the pricing and rental information across
different check-in weeks, I can use the mean and variance of the rental probability to identify
the demand parameters and the arrival process.
In the model, Qjt,k(M
j
t ) is the probability that at least one of the M
j
t arrived renters is
interested in listing k. Equation (3.5) denotes that Qjt,k(M
j
t ) has the following form.
Qjt,k(M
j





Gjt,k is defined in Equation (3.4) and is the probability for choosing listing k. Since the num-
ber of arrived renters M jt follows a Poisson distribution with parameter λ
j
t , I can calculate









































Equation (3.13) and (3.14). Therefore, I can separately identify the demand parameters
from the arrival process.
Finally, the identification of σ (the variance of the idiosyncratic shock to the host) relies
on the price variance among those listings with similar observed characteristics and states.
The identification of {mt} (the price adjustment cost) comes from the price adjustment
likelihood and the magnitude of the adjustments. The changes in demand and time lead
to price adjustments only when they are sufficient to justify the price adjustment cost. In
the data, even though some hosts do not have many price adjustments, the total number
of price adjustments during each of the four-time periods described in Equation (3.12) is
sufficient to identify {mt}. In practice, I did not encounter any issues in identifying the
price adjustment cost parameters.
3.6.2. Estimation
In order to avoid searching over a large set of parameters while solving the dynamic pricing
problem, I decided to split the estimation process into two steps. In the first step, I estimate
the demand parameters. Once the parameters from the demand function are recovered, I
estimate the price adjustment cost in the dynamic pricing step. The estimation of the price
adjustment cost is challenging. First, the decision variable, price, is a vector of size 7 since
each host needs to determine a price for each day within a week. I impose an additional
restriction on the price vector that a host only needs to choose a weekend price and a
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weekday price, and reduce to the dimension from 7 to 2. Second, no two listings are the
same, which means the value function is listing specific. In order to reduce the number of
the value functions, I employ a clustering method to group similar listings together.
Step 1: Demand Estimation
Let yjt,k denote the type j rental indicator for listing k at time t. If y
j
t,k = 1, it means listing












t,k = 1. at,k is the inventory at selling period t. The likelihood function on
rental incident is
Lk = P (yτk,k, yτk+1,k, ..., yT,k|aT+1,k; θ1)











where Djt,k is defined in Equation (3.8), D
0




t,k and θ1 is the set of demand
parameters. τk is the time when listing k is sold out or the check-in date approaches.
One potential problem in the demand estimation is that the effective nightly rate P jt,k is
potentially correlated with some unobserved factors which are included in the error εjt,k in
Equation (3.3). I deal with the price endogeneity by including a rich set of attributes and ex-
tra information about the listings. In the data set, I can observe all the displayed attributes
of a listing. In addition to the observed attributes, I supplement with the information such
as the age of the listing and the estimated house value provided by Infogroup. Even though
I use a rich set of attributes to alleviate price endogeneity, it cannot be ruled out since
no attribute set is all-encompassing. However, most of the existing econometric methods
dealing with price endogeneity is not feasible in my model. First, the Berry et al. (1995)
contraction mapping is not applicable because of the inventory structure of each listing.
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Given rental type j, each host only has one unit of “product” to sell. Therefore, the em-
pirical market share would be extremely noisy, with a large number of zeros. Second, while
the control function approach could potentially solve this issue, this method introduces an
extra random term to each listing choice. If the choice set is large, which is true in this
paper, the integration over the extra random terms becomes infeasible9. As a robustness
check for the performance of the attributes I include in the model, I estimate two linear
probability models – one with individual fixed effect and the other one without individual
fixed but with a larger set of attributes. The result (shown in the Appendix) indicates that
after controlling for enough attributes, the price endogeneity might be alleviated.
Step 2: Pricing
Once the demand parameters θ1, are recovered, I estimate the price adjustment cost. In
order to make this estimation feasible, I need to impose further structure on the problem.
In the problem, as formulated above, price is of dimension 7; namely, there is a different
price for each day of the week. This makes the problem very difficult to solve, so in order to
simplify the calculation, I assume that there are only two prices within a week: the weekday
price and the weekend price. Equivalently, a listing owner is choosing a weekday average
price and a weekend average price instead of selecting a price for each day.
Although the dimension of the decision variable is reduced, the large attribute space is also
problematic, especially when the demand function, the cleaning fee and price adjustment
cost are host specific. In the sample, there are 7662 different listings, which means I have to
solve 7662 different dynamic programming problems. To overcome the problem caused by
the idiosyncrasy of the listings, I apply a clustering method using k-means based on each
neighborhoods listing characteristics. I categorize each listing into one of the 252 clusters
(9 clusters in each of the 28 neighborhoods).
Based on the clustering result, the price adjustment cost has the form mt = m̄tP̄ , and P̄
9If there are 100 listings, then I need to take integration over 100 random variables.
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is a price index that is calculated as the average price in each cluster. In order to estimate






rjt (Pt, st) + E(Vt−1(st−1) | st, j)
]
−mtP̄ · 1(Pt 6= Pt+1)
be the choice specific value function. If Pt can take Ht different values, then the expected
value function can be expressed as

















The log-likelihood function for the pricing decision can be written as































where the singled-out term in the last line
v
PT,k






represents the choice probability for price PT . The initial price PT is called the “base
price” which reflects a listing owner’s belief about the value of her listing and is set before
the selling period. In the estimation, PT is the price that maximizes the value function,
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assuming that prices are identical for each selling period and the idiosyncratic shock ut
only appears in period T . Since this is a finite period problem, backward induction can be
employed. Further detail of the estimation is provided in the Appendix.
3.7. Estimation Results and Model Fit
The parameters are estimated using the estimation sample with 7,662 listings, and the model
fit simulation is based on the same sample. In the estimation step, the system states sst,
which summarize hosts’ pricing decisions and reduce the dimension of the pricing problem,
is assumed to be deterministic. Moreover, in the model fit simulation, since the system
states should be consistent with the pricing decision of all the hosts (equilibrium definition
in section 3.5.4), I use backward induction and forward simulation method to update the
system state. In this section, I present the results of the parameter estimation and the
model fit.
3.7.1. Parameter Estimates
In the demand estimation, I assume that rental types that have the same length of stay share
the same parameters. This simplification significantly reduces the number of parameters
while maintains the necessary renter segmentation. I first show the estimation results of
the arrival process in Table 21. All parameters are significant at the 1% level. Each column
in Table 21 shows the estimated parameters λjt that govern the Poisson arrival processes.
For instance, in the first column, λ (0, 7] is the average number of arrivals per day for
all one-day rentals from 1 to 7 days prior to the check-in date. The parameter estimates
suggest substantial variations in the arrival rate across different lengths of stay and time.
Renters who are interested in longer stay tend to arrive early for the booking. This is
compatible with the fact that 1) longer stay involves more complicated planning such as
flight ticket booking and 2) the number of hosts who can accommodate long stay renters is
decreasing. Thus, it is harder for those renters to find their desired listings if they arrive
late. Shorter stay renters make their booking decision relatively late. Moreover, one week
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Table 21: Parameters of the Arrival Process





























































The arrival process parameter λ can vary across selling period and length of stay. Given length
of stay, λ can take 4 values based on the days prior to check-in: 0-7 days, 8-21 days, 22-35 days
and 35-56 days. ∗90% ∗∗95% ∗∗∗99%.
before check-in (first row in Table 21), the arrival number for 1-day rentals is about 128 per
day (18*7), which is about 16 times higher than the number for 7-day rentals. However,
the daily arrival number for 1-day rentals is only one-half of the 7-day rentals two months
prior to the check-in.
In Table 22, I show the estimated price coefficients. The price coefficients are all significant
and of the expected sign. The implied demand elasticities range from 1.82 to 4.66 under
the estimate in Table 22. The result in this paper is in the reasonable range10. Long
stay renters are more price-sensitive than short-stay renters. Turning to the intertemporal
change in the price coefficients, renters are significantly more price-sensitive when it is more
than 5 weeks away from the check-in date than they are when it is only a week before the
check-in date. Even though renters are becoming less price-sensitive as the time approaches
the check-in date, prices are still decreasing. This indicates that other factors such as price
adjustment cost, the diminishing opportunities to sell and the inventory structure are crucial
in the analysis, otherwise less price-sensitive demand should suggest price increase. As for
other attributes of the listings, renters prefer listings with higher ratings, more reviews, less
restrictive cancellation policies and more photos. The details of other parameters in the
demand function are in the Appendix.
With the demand parameters in hand, I estimate the price adjustment cost. In principle,
10Also see Rust & Cho (2018) for hotel pricing, Williams (2020) for Airline pricing and Li & Srinivasan
(2019) for hotel and Airbnb pricing
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Table 22: Demand Estimation (price coefficients)





























































The price coefficients can vary across selling period and length of stay. Given length of stay, the price
coefficients can take 4 values based on the days prior to check-in: 0-7 days, 8-21 days, 22-35 days and
35-56 days. ∗90% ∗∗95% ∗∗∗99%.
Table 23: Price Adjustment Cost and Price Shock
Coef. Std. t-stat
Price Adjustment Cost
m̄(0, 7] .0089*** .0023 3.8696
m̄(7, 21] .0141*** .0041 3.4390
m̄(21, 35] .0175*** .0033 5.3030
m̄(35, 56] .0229*** .0052 4.4038
Logit shock
σ 1.5123*** .0211 71.6730
∗90% ∗∗95% ∗∗∗99%.
each host should have her own price adjustment cost. The price index P̄ serves as a tool to
reduce the dimensionality caused by the host-specific price adjustment cost. Therefore the
cost mt is in the form of m̄tP̄ and m̄t is invariant across hosts. Under this setting, all the
hosts within the same cluster have the same price adjustment cost, while this cost varies
across different clusters. In Table 23, the cost is about 2% of the price index two months
before the check-in date, and it drops to under 1% of the price index one week before the
check-in date. This result indicates that hosts are more likely to adjust their prices if the
check-in date is close. If I assume that the price index is $195, which is the average price in
the sample, the price adjustment costs are approximately $1.8 - $4.2. Although $1.8 and
$4.0 are not huge numbers compared to the rental price, they generate substantial price
stickiness in the data.
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3.7.2. Model Fit
In order to evaluate how well the model fits the data, I simulate the model using the esti-
mated parameters. Unlike the estimation step, where it is not necessary to solve the pricing
equilibrium, simulating from the model requires solving the value function and the pricing
function under different states. One challenge in the simulation is to calculate the path of
the system states {sst}. Although I have assumed that {sst} evolve deterministically, the
perceived state {ŝst} have to be consistent with the actual state {sst}. In fact, {ŝst} can
be updated via backward induction and forward simulation. The backward induction is
required for the value function and the forward simulation is utilized to calculate the prices
and update the system state. The solution method is summarized in Algorithm 1 in the Ap-
pendix. I start the algorithm using the system state calculated in the estimation procedure.
Then, I calculate the expected value function using backward induction. Once the value
function is calculated, I simulate both the prices and the purchase decision. With these two







Given the current price, the parameters in the demand model and the price adjustment cost,
I simulate 100 cases of pricing and rental decisions for the first week in October 2015 using
all 5,343 listings in the sample. In each case, I simulate hosts’ pricing decisions, renters’
arrival and their choices in each period. Since the price used in the model is discretized and
adjusted to weekday average and weekend average, I transform all the prices using the same
procedure. I simulate the model keeping the initial availability of each listing unchanged.
In Figure 19. I show the comparison between the data and the model prediction of the
number of rentals in each selling period. The model fits the data relatively well. Figure 20
addresses the model fit by comparing mean prices with model predicted prices, by the day
before check-in. Since I only consider weekday and weekend average price in the calculation,
this figure also demonstrates the comparison by weekday and weekend price.
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Figure 19: Model Fit of Rental Number
Figure 20: Model Fit of Average Weekday Price and Weekend Price
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3.8. Managerial Implications: Automated Pricing
In this section, I evaluate the revenue and welfare implications of automated pricing using
the estimated demand parameters. Automated pricing will influence both the timing and the
magnitude of price changes by reducing the price adjustment cost and taking into account
renter’s varying willingness to pay and inventory structure. When the price adjustment cost
exists, hosts’ pricing decisions are less responsive to these factors. However, if automated
pricing makes the pricing decision, it has the potential to react to any change in the market;
therefore the interaction among those factors may suggest a different optimal price path.
I conduct three counterfactual experiments exploring different forms of automated pricing.
First, I assume that automated pricing eliminates the price adjustment cost completely. In
the second counterfactual, I examine the possibility that automated pricing only reduces the
price adjustment cost but does not eliminate it. Therefore, I set the price adjustment cost
to half of its original level. Among other reasons, the reason for conducting this experiment
is that Airbnb also provides price suggestions for hosts. In the case of price suggestion, hosts
still need to adjust their prices manually. Therefore, price adjustment costs may still exist,
but the cost of price adjustment may be smaller than if there were no pricing suggestions
from Airbnb. Finally, in the last experiment, I assume that automated pricing eliminates
the price adjustment cost but adjusts the price every week instead of every day during the
selling period. Under this setting, the price adjustment frequency is 8 during the selling
period. The purpose of this experiment is to examine whether daily price adjustment is
necessary for automated pricing.
3.8.1. No Price Adjustment Cost
In this counterfactual, I assume that automated pricing eliminates the price adjustment cost
entirely. Although this counterfactual does not replicate the exact algorithm implemented
by Airbnb, it provides important insight into how automated pricing can help hosts set
their prices and the potential consequences of using such a pricing tool. From the platform’s
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perspective, if hosts’ prices are adjusted more frequently and it results in higher revenue,
the platform should put more effort to encourage the use of automated pricing, such as, for
example, promoting “smart pricing” more vigorously or sending out a daily reminder about
price checking to the hosts.
In order to simulate the counterfactual result, I follow a modified version of Algorithm 1 (in
the Appendix) with random initial availability. Since hosts’ prices can be changed without
any friction in each period, the price in the previous period is no longer a state variable in
the problem. Therefore, the expected value function becomes











The solution method for this problem is described in Algorithm 2 in the Appendix.
Compared with Algorithm 1, Algorithm 2 does not need to keep track of the price Pt+1
in period t. In addition, the initial price PT+1 is not necessary in the simulation. In this
frictionless regime, I simulate the optimal price path without the price adjustment cost for
each listing as well as the purchase decisions. With the simulated price path and purchase
pattern, I calculate the revenue of the hosts and the platform. I also calculate the surplus
of the renters.
Table 24 presents the simulation results. When price adjustment cost is turned off, the
average weekly revenue of the hosts is increased by approximately 3.9%. The platform also
benefits from the elimination of the friction, and its revenue rises by 4.8%. There are two
reasons why the revenue improvement for the platform is greater than the hosts. First, the
price adjustment cost does not enter into the platform’s revenue. Second, the cleaning fee
is included in the platform’s revenue but not in the hosts’ since I assume that the cleaning
fee is used to cover the actual cleaning cost for the hosts. The results in Table 24 also show
that the utilization rate, defined as the number of booked days over the number of available
days, increases from 31% to 36%.
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The Airbnb’s and the hosts’ revenues both increase if automated pricing is employed. How-
ever, the impact of automated pricing on the renters depends on the length of their stays,
or more precisely, when the renters arrive. In Table 24, consumer surplus for renters who
only stay for one or two days increase by about 4.8% and 3.8%, respectively. Renters who
stay for 5 or more days are better off under the automated pricing. For those renters who
stay for 3 or 4 days, they are worse off compared to the case where price adjustment is
costly.
These interesting findings are the direct result of the new optimal price path implied by
automated pricing. Figure 21 shows the simulation results of the prices. One interesting
pattern observed in this experiment is that the elimination of the price adjustment cost
generates a price path that first increases then decreases. This result is different from most
empirical papers on dynamic pricing – the realization of the price path is either increasing
or decreasing. At the beginning of the selling period (two months away), most of the renters
are those who would stay for a relatively long time. These renters’ price elasticity is higher
than those who want shorter stays. As the time approaches closer to the check-in date,
more short-stay renters arrive. The optimal prices account for this trend – the mixed price
elasticity is decreasing, which creates room for a price hike. On the other hand, hosts’
expectations for a future rental opportunity is decreasing. This force will pull down the
price. In addition, short rentals may create “orphan days” that are less likely to be rented.
Therefore, even though the inventory of a host is decreasing, she might still want to lower
down her price to account for those “orphan days”. If the mixed price elasticity is not
decreasing fast enough, the optimal price should drop.
3.8.2. Half Price Adjustment Cost
In the previous section, I assume that automated pricing eliminates the price adjustment
cost. In practice, in addition to automated pricing, Airbnb also provides price suggestions
to the hosts. This price suggestion can be treated as a semi-automated pricing tool. In this
section, I assume that the price friction is reduced to half of its current level. The expected
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Table 24: Revenue & Surplus: Case 1





























































Calculation is based on 100 simulations. Revenue is the revenue for a check-in week. CSi is the
per-person consumer surplus for rentals with length of i. The 95% confidence interval is in the
parenthesis.
Figure 21: Average Price: Case 1
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value function becomes











mt · 1(Pt 6= Pt+1) + ut

Since the price adjustment cost is not completely eradicated, the solution method to simulate
this counterfactual is Algorithm 1 (in the Appendix). Table 25 shows that the revenues of
the hosts and the platform are slightly improved under this experiment. The revenue of
host increases by 1.3% and the revenue of the platform increases by 1.9% if price adjustment
cost is reduced by 50%. Meanwhile, only the renters who are seeking 4-day or 5-day rental
are worse off if the price adjustment cost is reduced to half of its original level. Figure 22
is the average weekday price and weekend price. Since the price adjustment cost is not
eliminated entirely, the hosts still fail to fully respond to the change in price elasticity,
especially the decreasing trend at the beginning of the selling period. Furthermore, hosts
also fail to reduce their prices sufficiently to accommodate the forces that are driving down
the prices. Although price suggestions may not necessarily reduce the price adjustment cost
by 50%, this experiment provides evidence that if automated pricing does not eliminate the
price adjustment cost entirely, the revenue improvement might be limited.
3.8.3. Weekly Price Adjustment
In this section, I assume that automated pricing eliminates the price adjustment cost.
However, instead of changing a host’s price daily, automated pricing adjusts the host’s
price every week during the selling period. For instance, during the period between 14
days to 7 days prior to the check-in date, automated pricing sets a fixed price for this
7-day period. Ideally, automated pricing should adjust prices as frequently as necessary.
However, if weekly price adjustments can achieve revenue and welfare results that are similar
to those produced by daily price adjustment, weekly price adjustment might be sufficient for
automated pricing. In addition, computation and maintenance cost of automated pricing
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Table 25: Revenue & Surplus: Case 2





























































Calculation is based on 100 simulations. Revenue is the revenue for a check-in week. CSi is
the per-person consumer surplus for rentals with length of i. The 95% confidence interval is in
the parenthesis.
Figure 22: Average Price: Case 2
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may make weekly price adjustment attractive to the platform.
I simulate the dynamic pricing model without a price adjustment cost and update the
listing price every week during the selling period. In Table 26, it shows the revenue and
welfare results under two different price update frequencies. When the price is updated
weekly during the selling period is updated weekly, the host’s revenue is slightly less than
the revenue produced by daily updates. However, the revenue under these two cases is
close to each other based on the 95% confidence interval. The platform’s revenue is also
higher under daily price updates, but the difference is small. If I compare the revenue under
weekly automated pricing with the revenue under the baseline model (price adjustment is
costly), the result shows that weekly automated pricing increases the revenue of the host by
3.4% and the platform by 4.1%. Similar to the daily automated pricing, weekly automated
pricing increases the consumer surplus for renters who do not stay for 3 or 4 days.
In the first experiment, automated pricing induces a hump-shaped price path. In Figure
23, one can see that the average weekend price and weekday price under weekly automated
pricing also demonstrate a first increasing then decreasing trend. Although weekly auto-
mated pricing can capture the overall trend as daily automated pricing, it misses some
price movement due to the restriction of price update frequency. However, the revenue
and welfare differences between weekly and daily automated pricing are small. This result
suggests that if the daily update is costly for the platform, the weekly update can be a good
alternative choice.
3.9. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I have taken advantage of the availability of a rich data set for Airbnb that in-
cludes all the available characteristics, price trajectory and transaction history. This enables
me to explore the pricing behavior of the hosts across the selling period. A large proportion
of the listing owners do not change their prices and this is modeled under the combination
of intertemporal price discrimination, stochastic demand, competition and price adjustment
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Table 26: Revenue & Surplus: Case 3





























































Calculation is based on 100 simulations. Revenue is the revenue for a check-in week.
CSi is the per-person consumer surplus for rentals with length of i. The 95% confidence
interval is in the parenthesis.
Figure 23: Average Price: Case 3
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cost. By using a dynamic pricing model, I estimate that this price adjustment cost is around
0.98% to 2.1% of the price index. Because of the price adjustment cost, hosts’ pricing deci-
sions may fail to respond to changes in the market or even to their own states. This implies
that automated pricing could potentially improve their revenues by influencing both when
to adjust the price and how much to adjust the price.
The counterfactual experiments that simulate automated pricing offer several managerial
insights. I discover that automated pricing increases the revenue of Airbnb by about 4.8%
and the hosts by 3.9% if the price adjustment cost is eliminated by automated pricing.
Renters who book either late or early during the selling period benefit from the automated
pricing; specifically, renters with shorter stays (1 or 2 days) tend to arrive late but renters
with a longer stay (5,6 or 7 days) tend to arrive early. However, renters who arrive around
the middle of the selling period (rentals of 3 or 4 days) actually become worse off. Although
the information about the exact number of hosts who are using automated pricing is not
accessible, this analysis provides useful and important evidence for supporting automated
pricing. If automated pricing is provided in the form of price suggestion, the price ad-
justment cost is not reduced to zero. In this case, revenue improvement might be limited.
Lastly, the counterfactual experiment suggests that weekly price updates for automated
pricing could be an alternative choice for the platform if daily updates are costly.
The methodology presented in this study is applicable to other cases where the market
is highly decentralized and each seller only has limited items to sell. For instance, in the
secondary sport and event ticket market, prices are also decreasing but rigid. In the peer-to-
peer rental car market, sellers face a similar problem as the hosts on Airbnb. Therefore, the
model in this paper can also help model the sellers’ pricing behavior in those markets and
evaluate the impact of automated pricing or other features that will affect sellers’ pricing
choices.
There are two limitations in this paper. The first one is price endogeneity. I use a very rich
set of characteristics to mitigate this problem, but price endogeneity is yet to be ruled out.
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In order to address the price endogeneity, a valid instrument and implementable method
are both required. The second limitation is the assumption about non-strategic renters.
The timing of the purchase is of paramount importance in various industries. The existence
of strategic customers may have a substantial impact on a firm’s decision. Because of the
complexity of my pricing model, I have to abstract away strategic customers. However, this
is absolutely an important direction for future research.
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CHAPTER 4 : CONCLUSION
Using a detailed Airbnb transaction and characteristics data, this dissertation provides
an empirical study of two aspects of the newly established peer-to-peer short-term rental
platform. From the point of view of the impact on the traditional long-term rental market,
I combine renters’ moving history with Airbnb data, build a dynamic location choice model,
and evaluate the effect of two widely debated policies that aim at restricting the operation
of Airbnb. From the point of view of the pricing mechanism, I use a dynamic pricing model
to evaluate the impact of Airbnb’s automated pricing feature.
Chapter 2 focuses on the impact of Airbnb on the traditional long-term rental market.
In this chapter, I building an empirical structural model allowing that forward-looking,
long-term renters make their location choices by taking into account potential income from
listing their apartments on Airbnb. The results suggest Airbnb has a greater impact on
renters who earn a higher income since Airbnb listings are more populated in the areas
where renters are wealthier. In the counterfactual, I discover that the multi-dwelling law is
much more effective in protecting the welfare of long-term renters than the night cap policy.
Therefore, enforcing the multi-dwelling law will benefit the long-term renters most.
Chapter 3 turns from the relationship between short-term and long-term rental to the
Airbnb platform itself. This chapter is motivated by a puzzling observation that a large
proportion of listing owners do not adjust their prices. By using a dynamic pricing model,
I quantify the price adjustment cost that causes the price rigidity among listing owners.
Furthermore, with the established dynamic pricing model, I also evaluate the impact of the
automated pricing feature. The result suggests that automated pricing can significantly
improve the revenue of both the listing owners and the platform.
Airbnb is a newly established peer-to-peer platform that could be a game-changer to both
the hospitality market and the long-term rental market. An integrated framework that





A.1. Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1.1. Demand Estimation Detail
In the estimation of long-term rental demand, the empirical choice probability P̂j,t is re-
quired to calculate the maximum likelihood. One hurdle in the estimation is that some
choices may have few number of observations. This will cause P̂j,t inaccurate and unstable
in the estimation. To overcome the small sample problem, I use kernel smoothing method
to calculate P̂j,t. In this application, instead of simply calculating observed shares as the
portion of long-term renters who choose an option j, I use a weighted measure to avoid some
small sample issues. I do this to incorporate the information from surrounding locations
when calculating shares. Naturally, the weights will depend on how long the radius is based
on location distance and the distance in the type space. Denoting the weights by W, the








where Z̄i includes the option before moving, the type of renters, and the length of occupancy.
Zig,t is the distance between renter g and the location specified in Z̄
i. In particular, the











where K is the dimension of Zig,t and b(k) is the bandwidth.
A.1.2. Solving the Equilibrium
In this subsection, I provide the step-by-step process to solve the equilibrium. The dynamic
location choice problem is a infinite horizon problem. However, the infinite horizon problem
106
involves a high dimensional value function approximation. Therefore, I assume a long-term
renter does not consider future value after T̄ years. TS is the number of years in the sample.
Algorithm 1 Solution Method
1: Initialize η = η0, t=1
2: while t ≤ TS do
3: Given initial pj,t, rj,t and nj,t, generate paths for rental price, Airbnb price and
Airbnb share using Equation (2.20)-(2.22) with η0
4: for ι = T̄ → t do
5: Calculate the choice specific value function vj,ι given pj,τ , rj,τ and nj,τ , τ ≥ ι
6: end for
7: end for
8: Calculate the demand DL of long-term rental using Equation (2.15) given the choice
specific value function from step
9: Calculate the new equilibrium rental prices p∗j,t and Airbnb prices r
∗
j,t using the
market condition in Equation (2.14) and (2.16)









j,t are close to pj,t, rj,t and nj,t then, t=t+1
12: else pj,t = p
∗
j,t, rj,t = r
∗
j,t nj,t = n
∗
j,t and go back to step 3
13: end if
14: end while
15: Calculate η∗ using Equation (2.20)-(2.22) and regression
16: if | η∗ − η0 |< ε then end the algorithm
17: else η0 = η
∗ and go to step 1
18: end if
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A.2. Appendix to Chapter 3
A.2.1. Model Specification of the Illustrative Example
In this simple model, the seller has an inventory in the form of (a,b,c). There is only 1
unit of each product. I also assume that only the single product, adjacent products or all
3 products can be sold in each purchase. In total, there are six combinations: (a), (b), (c),
(a,b), (b,c) and (a,b,c). In each period, only one customer arrives. The customer is equally
likely to be interested in each of the six product combinations. Let xt be the inventory
vector and bj denote one of the six product combination. Dt(pt) is the probability that
determines whether the customer makes the final purchase decision. Therefore, the revenue

















where πt is the probability determines which product combination the customer is interested
and |j| denotes the number of products in product combination j. In this example, I assume
Dt(pt) use the parameter setting in case 2.
A.2.2. Sample Construction
The current analysis focuses on listings in the borough of Manhattan in New York City.
New York City is Airbnb’s largest market in North America and Manhattan concentrates
more than 50% of all the listings in NYC. Therefore this sample should be relatively repre-
sentative for large cities. In addition, because Airbnb is a highly decentralized market, the
idiosyncrasy of the listings significantly increases the computation burden. Restricting the
sample to this area, therefore, strikes a balance between reality and implementability.
To further restrict the number of observations, only listings classified as “entire apartment‘”
are considered. The reason for this restriction is twofold. First, listing type is the most used
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filter on Airbnb when renters are searching for listings. Therefore, listings with different
apartment types may not be considered at the same time. Second, hosts with shared room
or private room listings are more likely to block their listings. This behavior might add
extra complication to the model. After eliminating the listings that do not fit these criteria,
there are 6,910 listings in the sample. A few extra sample restrictions are also imposed.
First, I only include listings with 2 bedrooms or fewer, and this filtering reduces the number
of listings to 6,311. Moreover, in order to simplify the modeling of inventory transition, I
only include listings with minimum stay requirements that are not greater than 2 days in
my sample. In those 5,992 listings which satisfy the minimum stay filtering, I keep 5,343 of
them whose prices are between $50 and $350.
In principle, the prices set by the hosts can vary along two dimensions. One is the variation
across different check-in date, and the other one is the variation across time for a given
check-in dates. While this paper addresses both of these variations, more emphasis is
placed on the second. Therefore, the sample only includes the check-in dates between Oct
4, 2015 and Oct 31, 2015. A longer period would make this analysis more credible; however,
the complexity brought by the longer period may outweigh the benefit.
In this paper, I also supplement the analysis with the data from Infogroup that provides an
estimated value of the apartment and the data on the age of the apartment. The additional
information help control individual-specific characteristics. However, the matching between
Airbnb data and the Infogroup data is not straightforward. Airbnb does not provide the
exact location of a listing. In general, the distance between the true location and the data
location ranges from 0-400 feet. I assign each listing to the nearest residential building and
use this to match the Infogroup data set.
A.2.3. Estimation Details of the Pricing Model
One challenge in the pricing model estimation is the number of listing. Since each listing
has its own characteristics and cleaning fee, the number of value functions grows with the
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number of listings. In order to bypass this obstacle, I use the clustering and interpolation
method.
First, each listing belongs to one of the 28 neighborhoods in the borough of Manhattan.
In each neighborhood, a listing can be characterized by a two-dimensional vector (Xβ, f)
where Xβ measures how renters value the attributes X and f is the cleaning fee.
Second, I use the k-means method to categorize (Xβ, f) into 3*3=9 different levels. I only
calculate the value function at these levels in each neighborhood. The number of the value
functions reduces to 28*9=252. Although this is still a large number, parallel computing
can handle the problem of this size without difficulty.
The other challenge in the estimation is the dimension of the price vector. Price Pt is
a vector with length 7. Even when each element can take 20 values, the total possible
combinations are 207 ≈ 1.2 billion. In order to reduce the calculate burden but maintain
certain flexibility in the price, I assume that hosts only choose weekday average price and
weekend average price. In my sample, 76% of the hosts either set one price for the entire
week or one price for the weekend and one price for the weekday. With this simplification,
the dimension of Pt is reduced to 2. In the estimation, Pt can only take integer number and
the total number of grid points in Pt is 25*25=625. Therefore, the total number of states
in each cluster is T ∗ |Pt| ∗ |at| = 56 ∗ 625 ∗ 128 = 4, 480, 000
A.2.4. Price Endogeneity
In this section, I estimate the demand using a linear probability model.
yt,k = Xkγ1 + Zt,kγ2 + FEk + FEt + FEL + εt,k
where yt,k is a binary variable denoting whether listing k is rented or not at t days prior to
the given check-in date. Xk are the time-invariant characteristics of the listing and Zt,k are
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the number of competitors and the average price in the neighborhood. FEk, FEt and FEL
are the individual listing fixed effect, time fixed effect and neighborhood fixed effect. In this
model, I can control unobserved individual characteristics by adding a fixed effect. In Table
27, I show that, when a sufficient number of observed characteristics are controlled for, the
price endogeneity problem can, to some extent, be alleviated. Column (3) in Table 27 is
the result with individual fixed effect and Column (5) is without fixed effect but with extra
controls. The price coefficients in both columns are close to each other, which indicates
that the extra variables added to Column (5) can control for the unobserved factors which
may affect both the price and the demand. This example serves as evidence to support that
controlling for additional characteristics in the model can alleviate the price endogeneity.
One caveat of this example is that the results should not be over-interpreted. The demand
model used in this paper is highly non-linear and far more complicated than this linear
model, therefore, even though I have controlled for these additional characteristics shown
in Column (5), the price could still be correlated with other unobserved factors which also
influence the demand.
A.2.5. Solution Method in Detail
In order to solve the pricing equilibrium, one needs to calculate the path of the system
states sst. From the perspective of the hosts, sst are given when they are making their
pricing decisions. However, the perceived ˆsst should be consistent with the actual sst. This
condition guarantees that each host is setting their price according to the equilibrium.
The solution method starts with a guess of the system states {ssj,(0)t }, which can be calcu-
lated from the baseline model. With the system states {ssj,(k)t } in the kth iteration, I can
calculate the expected value function and the policy function through backward induction.
Given the information about the expected value function and the policy function, I can
simulate the pricing decision and rental decision. For each simulation path, I can calculate
one path for the system states. The new system states {ssj,(k+1)t } are updated as the av-
erage over all the simulation paths. The details of this solution method is summarized in
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Table 27: Demand Estimation (linear probability)


























































































































































































time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
individual fixed effect No No Yes No No Yes





Algorithm 2 Solution Method (with Friction)
Initialize ss
j,(0)
t for all t and j, iteration indicator k=0
2: for t = 1→ T do
Calculate the expected value function EV
(k+1)
t (pt+1, at+1) assuming ss
j,(k)
t is known





Simulate the initial price p
(k+1)
0 according to the choice probability in Equation (3.16)
8: for t = T → 1 do
Simulate price p
(k+1)
t according to Equation (3.15)
10: Simulate the purchase decision according to the demand probability Equation (3.8)
end for
12: end for
Update new system state ss
j,(k+1)
t for all t and j
14: Iterate through step 2-11 until |EV k+1t − EV kt | < ε
If the price adjustment cost is zero, the price in the last period does not enter into the
current period value function. Therefore, the price in the last period is no longer a state
variable. The solution method, in this case, is similar to the baseline model except that the
inventory at and time t are the only state variables in the problem. Algorithm 2 summarized
the detail of the solution method in this case.
Algorithm 3 Solution Method (without Friction)
Initialize ss
j,(0)
t for all t and j, iteration indicator k=0
2: for t = 1→ T do
Calculate the expected value function EV
(k+1)





6: for t = T → 1 do
Simulate price p
(k+1)
t according to Equation (3.15) but replace EVt with Equation
(3.17)
8: Simulate the purchase decision according to the demand probability Equation (3.8)
end for
10: end for
Update new system state ss
j,(k+1)
t for all t and j
12: Iterate through step 2-11 until |EV k+1t − EV kt | < ε
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Table 28: Demand Estimation (other coefficients)






















































































































































































































A.2.6. Detailed Estimation Results of the Demand
In this section, I show the detailed estimation results of the demand model. In Table 28,
one can see that listings with a higher rating are more likely to be rented. The number of
reviews and the length of those reviews positively affect the rental probability. Moreover,
renters prefer listings that have higher property value and longer operation history in the
market. Renters with shorter stay prefer listings in a newer building, but renter with longer
stay prefer listings in an older building.
A.2.7. Inventory Structure
In this section I show the detail of the inventory inventory vector which is at the core of
the multi-day rental analysis. Let m denote the number of days the listing owner groups
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c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 c13
Sun. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Mon. 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
Tue. 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
Wed. 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
Thu. 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
Fri. 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Sat. 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
together. For instance, if a listing owner groups 7 days (a week) together, then m = 7. Let
n be the number of all possible combinations of stays within this m days period. Since at
most one rental type is accepted in each period and each rental consists of consecutive days,
a rental cannot include Monday and Wednesday but exclude Tuesday. Let A be an m× n
incident matrix with 0\1 entry. The example below is the incident matrix with m = 3.
case1 case2 case3 case4 case5 case6 case7

Mon. 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
Tue. 0 0 1 0 1 1 1
Wed. 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
Case 1 shows there is no rental, and Case 2 to Case 4 are one-day rentals. Case 5 and Case
6 are two different types of two-day rentals. The last column, Case 7, is a three-day rental.
Let at denote an m× 1 availability vector with 0 in the ith entry representing the ith day
is occupied. Let Aj be the jth column of the incident matrix A. If a type j rental Aj is
realized, the next period inventory vector at−1 can be expressed as
at−1 = at − (Aj)′
If m = 7, which is the case in the model, there are 29 different cases (28 renal cases + 1 no
rental)
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c14 c15 c16 c17 c18 c19 c20 c21 c22
Sun. 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Mon. 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
Tue. 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
Wed. 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
Thu. 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
Fri. 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
Sat. 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
c23 c24 c25 c26 c27 c28 c29
Sun. 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
Mon. 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
Tue. 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
Wed. 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
Thu. 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
Fri. 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
Sat. 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
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